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THE FAILURE OF THE FLORIDA JUDICIAL REVIEW
PROCESS TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE INCENTIVES FOR
AGENCY RULEMAKING*
JoIINNY C. BURRIS**
[T]he powers that are committed to ... regulating agencies, and
which they must have to do their work, carry with them great and
dangerous opportunities of oppression and wrong.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE propagation of administrative agencies on both the federal
and state levels in the post-New Deal era decisively shifted the
public policy decision making process from the elected public policy
makers in the legislature and executive branches of government to ad-
ministrative agencies, 2 composed of appointed officials which are gen-
erally not directly accountable to the electorate.' With the shift of
*Copyright 1990 Johnny C. Burris
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center. This Article is a sub-
stantially expanded and revised version of my speech before the Seventh Administrative Law
Conference which was held on March 16-17, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. I gratefully acknowl-
edge the research assistance I received from Ellen Fell Baig, a 1990 graduate of Nova University
Shepard Broad Law Center, and Laurie Moss, a student at Nova University Shepard Broad Law
Center, in the preparation of my speech and this Article.
1. E. ROOT, Public Service by the Bar, in ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CnENSHIP
535 (1916).
2. See, e.g., J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEoIIMAcy: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978); R. Hio s, CRISIS AND LEVIATtAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE
GROWTH OF AMERIcAN GovERNMmENT (1987); J. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41
Pun. INTEREST 77 (1975). Several academic and political commentators have suggested that the
Federal Reserve Board is the most powerful entity in our society. See, e.g., M. NEWTON, THE
FED: INSIDE TH FEDERAL RESERVE, THE SECRET POWER CENTER THAT CONTROLS TH AMERICAN
ECONOMY (1983).
3. Not all administrative agencies have escaped the burden of electoral accountability. For
example, the members of the State Board of Education are elected and at one time members of
the Public Service Commission were also elected. See FLA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 2; FLA. STAT §
350.01 (1977). In theory, administrative agencies are indirectly accountable to the people through
the controls over administrative agencies exercised by the elected representatives of the people.
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most public policy making to modern administrative agencies, 4 admin-
istrative agencies emerged as an omnipotent institutional tool capable
of shaping the fundamental nature of our society.5 As Justice Jackson
noted, "[t]he rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most
significant legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values to-
day are affected by their decisions than by those of all the courts,
review of administrative decisions apart. ' '6 Fortunately or unfortu-
nately, depending on one's point of view, the influence of administra-
tive agencies shows no sign of being diminished anytime soon. 7 Given
4. Of course, not all public policy choices are made by administrative agencies. Such a
process would clearly be unconstitutional in Florida. E.g., Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372
So. 2d 913, 925 (Fla. 1978); accord Industrial Union Dep't. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 671-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). While the legisla-
ture and the executive jointly create a general public policy position embodied in legislation, the
all important details are almost always left to administrative agencies. It is the details for the
implementation of the general public policy choice that brings it to life in our society. See, e.g.,
Brewster Phosphates v. State Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 444 So. 2d 483, 485 (Fla. 1st DCA),
review denied, 450 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1984). Given the degree of discretion usually granted admin-
istrative agencies in implementing a policy, the details promulgated by the administrative agency
can radically alter the impact of the legislation on our society. See, e.g., id. at 486-87.
5. By limiting my comments to the role of administrative agencies, I do not intend to
suggest that other institutions, both public and private, do not play important roles in shaping
the nature of our society. These other institutions are also important, but usually only in limited
fields. What sets the category of administrative agencies apart from these other institutions is
their persuasive impact on society. The discretionary powers wielded by administrative agencies
on the national, state, and local levels directly or indirectly impact on the day to day lives of
every person in our society. See generally B. Acana-A, RECONSTRUCTINo AmmucAN LAW
(1984) (arguing that the rise of the administrative state transformed the nature of our legal cul-
ture and requires a new type of "activist lawyering"); A. BERLE, POWER (1969) (examines the
nature of the power exercised by various private and public institutions); C. SusTEIN, AFTER THE
RioHTs REVOLUTION: REcoNCErVINO THE REouLATORY STATE (1990).
6. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
7. As early as the 1930's, commentators were noting the seemingly inevitable growing reli-
ance on administrative agencies in our society.
Despite... [the) chorus of abuse and tirade, the growth of the administrative process
shows little sign of being halted .... [I]ts extraordinary growth in recent years, the
increasing frequency with which government has come to resort to it, the extent to
which it is creating new relationships between the individual, the body economic, and
the state, already have given it great stature.
J. LANDIS, Tme ADhaNsTRATIVE PaocEss 4-5 (1938). Both Presidents Reagan and Carter pre-
sided over major deregulation efforts which had little impact on our dependence on administra-
tive agencies. As Professor Bonfield noted, deregulation, even if a success, has done little to alter
our continued and expanding reliance on administrative agencies. "[Diespite recent efforts to
deregulate certain sectors of our economy, the long-term upward curve of legislative delegation
to administrative agencies of law-making authority has not been disturbed." A. BoNImLD,
STATE AD MINsTRATV RuiL nu 4 (1986); see C. SusTEiN, supra note 5; McGarity, Regula-
tory Reform and the Positive State: An Historical Overview, 38 ArnmsN. L. Rv. 399 (1986). The
failure, or at the very least problematic success, of the so-called deregulation movement actually
may ultimately further enhance the powers of administrative agencies as our society adjusts to
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the preeminent role of administrative agencies in our society, it is not
surprising that the imposition of an effective set of limits or controls
on the discretion exercised by administrative agencies, without unduly
damaging their ability to perform their assigned duties, has been a
constant concern of the elected branches of government8 and a topic
of much discussion in the academic community.9
In Florida, one of the principal tools used to assure that administra-
tive agencies act in a manner consistent with the will of the legislative
and executive branches of government is the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA).10 The general nature of the limitations imposed on
the discretion of administrative agencies by the APA was noted by the
court in McDonald v. Department of Banking & Finance:"
In three important respects ... the APA affects the scope and
manner of exercise of agency discretion: (1) the APA prescribes the
process by which disputed facts are found; (2) it requires that the
agency adopt as rules its policy statements of general applicability,
requires agency proof of incipient policy not expressed in rules and
permits countervailing evidence and argument; and (3) it requires an
agency to explain the exercise of its discretion and subjects that
explanation to judicial review.' 2
the collapse or serious malfunctioning of such institutions as banks and savings and loans after
deregulation. See generally S. TOLCHiN & M. ToLcmN, DtSMANTLzNG AmERiCA: THE RUSH TO
DEREGULATE (1983); TRANSPORTATION SAFETY IN AN AGE OF DEREGULATION (L. Moses & I. Sav-
age ed. 1989); Berger, Wiley, Patrick, Tisch & Blake, Broadcast Deregulation: The Reagan Years
and Beyond, 40 AroN. L. REv. 345 (1988); Dempsey, The Dark Side of Deregulation: Its Im-
pact on Small Communities, 39 ADhnN. L. REV. 445 (1987).
8. See, e.g., Reporter's Comments on Proposed Administrative Procedure Act for the
State of Florida, reprinted in 3 A. ENGLAND & L. LEvINsoN, FLORIDA ADmnCarsAiTv PRACTICE
MAN AL 3-7 (1979) (appendix C) [hereinafter Reporter's Comments]; Senate Comm. on Gov't
Affairs, Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Agencies, S. Doc. No. 95-26, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977) (volume II); Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 1193, 1246-49 (1982); Report of the Committee with Studies of Administrative Manage-
ment in the Federal Government (1937).
9. See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (thoughtful discussions on the
problems associated with attempting to control administrative discretion); K. DAVIs, DISCRE-
TIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELMNARY INQUIRY (1969); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRA-
TrvE ACTION (1965); T. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALiSM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF
PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1979).
10. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.50-.73 (1989). The current Administrative Procedure Act was
adopted in 1974 and went into effect in 1975. See id. § 120.72(1)(a). While it has been amended
on numerous occasions the basic design and provisions of the 1974 APA have remained in place
to date. See Burris, Administrative Law, The 1987 Survey of Florida Law, 12 NovA L. REV. 299,
357-60 & n.404 (1988).
11. 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla 1st DCA 1977).
12. Id. at 577. This is not an exhaustive list of the checks on the discretion of administrative
agencies. See, e.g., Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978). Even in the
APA there are other important potential institutional checks on the discretion of administrative
agencies such as the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.52 (4), .545
(1989). See also id. § 11.60.
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These constraints on administrative agency discretion were designed to
statutorily mandate that administrative agencies provide adequate op-
portunities in the administrative process for governmental institutions,
interested parties, and the general public to participate in the proc-
esses by which administrative agencies develop public policy. The the-
ory underlying the APA was that a process assuring the possibility of
broad participation in administrative agency decision making would
offer the public and interested parties the best opportunity to check
possible abuses of discretion. 3 In the scheme established in the APA,
the courts play a critical role in assuring that administrative agencies
comply with the processes set forth in the APA and thus indirectly
insure that adequate access to the public policy making process carried
on by administrative agencies is maintained.
This Article offers a critical review and evaluation of how the Flor-
ida courts have performed one of the institutional roles assigned to
them in the APA - appropriately limiting the discretion of administra-
tive agencies in selecting the process used to promulgate public policy.
This Article is prepared on the assumption that the legislature, in
adopting the APA, imposed a requirement that administrative agen-
cies generally develop public policy through rules in the rulemaking
process 4 rather than in final orders rendered at the conclusion of the
adjudicatory process. 5 This position on the intent of the legislature in
adopting the APA is relatively controversial and is criticized by those
who have reached the conclusion that the APA expresses no such
strong preference for the rulemaking process.
II. THE THEORY OF A PREFERENCE FOR RULEMAKING
There are primarily two processes which administrative agencies can
use in developing legally binding public policy - rulemaking and adju-
dication.' 6 In theory, administrative agencies should use the rulemak-
ing process to establish legally binding public policy of general
13. See Reporter's Comments, supra note 8, at 3.
14. FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1989).
15. Id. § 120.57 (1989).
16. "Every policy statement an agency relies upon in reaching a decision must be either
codified as a rule or expressly stated in an order." Florida Cities Water Co. v. Florida Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 384 So. 2d 1280, 1282 (Fla. 1980) (Boyd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 580-81. This statement is generally true, but there are other
methods by which administrative agencies can establish legally binding public policy. See De-
partment of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Barr, 359 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (the
court noted that a declaratory statement can validly establish an administrative agency's policy
position without going through the rulemaking process); FLA. STAT. § 120.565 (1989); Cf. Palm
Springs Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Health Care Cost Contain. Bd., 560 So. 2d 1348, 1349 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1990) (the court validated the use of settlement agreements to resolve pending disputes).
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applicability.' 7 The adjudication process should be used to determine
the substantial interests of parties" under the relevant statutes and ad-
ministrative rules and only incidentally to develop legally binding pub-
lic policy. Generally, the results of the rulemaking process are
ultimately embodied in administrative rules and the results of the ad-
judicatory process are ultimately embodied in administrative agency
orders. The distinction between these two means for exercising admin-
istrative agency authority to develop public policy was diminished in
the APA by providing in some cases for additional procedural protec-
tion during the rulemaking process.' 9 In cases where these procedural
protections are invoked during the rulemaking process, it would
closely resemble adjudication. Despite the procedural convergence of
rulemaking and adjudication there still was a general consensus that
administrative agencies, at least in theory, should prefer the rulemak-
ing process over adjudication as the means for developing public pol-
icy, 2° because the rulemaking process was designed to maximize public
participation and fairness through its notice, hearing, and publication
17. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(16) (1989).
18. See id. § 120.57.
19. This was done in order to avoid some of the evils associated with the formalistic ap-
proaches courts had used in evaluating the significance of the dichotomy between rules and or-
ders. Reporter's Comments, supra note 8, at 6-7, 10, 17-18. Prior to the adoption of the 1974
version of the APA, the courts encouraged parties to engage in arguments over whether the
wrong method for seeking judicial review was used in light of the type of administrative agency
action taken. See, e.g., De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 914-15 (Fla. 1957); Bryan v. Lan-
dis, 106 Fla. 19, 142 So. 650 (1932); Board of Pub. Instruction v. Sack, 212 So. 2d 819, 821-22
(Fla. Ist DCA), cert. denied, 219 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1968); Harris v. Goff, 151 So. 2d 642, 643-44
(Fla. 1st DCA 1963). A variation on this argument, which was understandably a favorite of the
administrative agencies, was that the subject matter did not concern an administrative agency's
quasi-legislative powers covered by the APA rulemaking process or an administrative agency's
quasi-judicial powers covered by the APA adjudicatory processes. In such cases, the power exer-
cised by the agency was quasi-executive, and the administrative agency was not subject to any of
the constraints imposed by the APA-including the judicial review process created by the APA.
See, e.g., Dickinson v. Judges of the Dist. Ct. App., First Dist., 282 So. 2d 168, 168-69 (Fla.
1973); Bay Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dickinson, 229 So. 2d 302, 306-08 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969);
Carbo, Inc. v. Meiklejohn, 212 So. 2d 328, 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968). The courts have rejected
attempts to resurrect this particular argument under the 1974 version of the APA. See, e.g.,
Groves-Watkins Constructors v. Department of Transp., 511 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987),
rev. on other grounds, 530 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1988).
20. "The model of responsible agency action under the APA is action faithful to statutory
purposes and limitations, foretold to the public as fully as practicable by substantive rules, and
refined and adapted to particular situations through orders in individual cases." Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Department of Bus. Reg., 393 So. 2d 1177, 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); see also
Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Indiantown Tel. Sys., 435 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983);
Cf. A. BomLD, supra note 7, at 114-18; K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 102-03, 221-22; Berg, Re-
examining Policy Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudication, 38 ADNa. L.
REV. 149 (1986) (discussing the preference for rulemaking); Mayton, The Legislative Resolution
of the Rulemaking Versus Adjudication Problem in Agency Lawmaking, 1980 DuKE L.J. 103.
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requirements.21 "We must remember ... one prime goal of the 1974
Administrative Procedure Act ... [was] to encourage agencies of the
executive branch to interpret statutes in their regulatory care deliber-
ately, decisively, prospectively, and after consideration of comments
from the general public and affected parties . . . [through] rulemak-
ing."" This preference for rulemaking was justified by relying on the
assumption that rulemaking, as compared to adjudication, was a
functionally superior means of developing public policy in a logical
fashion. The procedural advantages of the rulemaking process were
thought to enhance the probability that administrative agencies would
select the most rational policy choice in light of the information avail-
able, competing policy arguments, and appropriate political consider-
ations .23
III. THE Loss OF THE RULEMAKING PREFERENCE IN PRACTICE
As is often the case, there is a substantial discrepancy between the
theory and the practice of administrative agencies. Many administra-
tive agencies are antagonistic toward extensive public participation in
the rulemaking process. Extensive public participation in the rulemak-
ing process is viewed as a substantial impediment to the proper exer-
cise of their rulemaking powers. In fact, such participation is seen as
an expensive process that generally generates few, if any, benefits and
does not enhance the quality of an administrative agency's decision
making. Many agencies believe that the process merely serves as a
method for delaying an administrative agency's efforts to promulgate
appropriate rules by permitting parties to the rulemaking process to
request that an administrative agency: (1) hold an information gather-
ing hearing concerning the substantive merits of the proposed rule;24
21. See Hyde, Rulemaking Redux, 12 ADm. L. SEC. NEWSL. 1 (Sept. 1990); Kennedy, A
National Perspective of Administrative Law and the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, 3
FiA. ST. U.L. REv. 65 (1975); Note, Rulemaking and Adjudication Under the Florida Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 27 U. FLA. L. Rav. 755, 759-63 (1975).
22. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Framat Realty, Inc., 407 So. 2d 238,
241 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
23. See Anheuser-Busch, 393 So. 2d at 1182; A. BolFIELw, supra note 7, at 4-11; Bonfield,
The Quest for an Ideal State Administrative Rulemaking Procedure, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. Rv. text
accompanying notes 1-9 (1990); Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95
HAgv. L. Rav. 393 (1981). Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at
Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. Rav. 485
(1970); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking and Adjudication in the Development of Adminis-
trative Policy, 78 HAiv. L. REv. 921 (1965).
24. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(a) (1989) states:
If the intended action concerns any rule other than one relating exclusively to organi-
zation, procedure, or practice, the agency shall, on the request of any affected person
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(2) hold the so called "drawout" information gathering hearing; 21 or
(3) participate in a section 120.54(4) hearing before a hearing officer
on the issue of whether the "proposed rule is an invalid exercise of
delegated legislative authority.'' 26 Each of these hearings cause delays
in the rulemaking processes. Perhaps the most commonly used-and
the most deadly to a speedy rulemaking process-is a section
120.54(4) hearing. It can create a considerable delay in the rulemaking
process, because the administrative agency is prohibited from issuing
the rule "until the hearing officer has rendered his decision ....
In such hearings, the hearing officer's order is considered final agency
action28 and is subject to judicial review, a process that may signifi-
cantly further delay the rulemaking process. 29 Similar delays can occur
in a "drawout" information gathering hearing.
If the agency determines that the rulemaking proceeding is not
adequate to protect... [a person whose substantial interests will be
affected], it shall suspend the rulemaking proceeding and convene a
separate proceeding under the provisions of s. 120.57.... Upon
received within 21 days after the date of publication of the notice, give affected per-
sons an opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues under considera-
tion appropriate to inform it of their contentions .... The agency... if requested by
any affected person, shall schedule a public hearing on the [proposed] rule.
See Dore, Access to Florida Administrative Proceedings, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 965, 995-1003
(1986).
25. F x. STAT. § 120.54(17) (1989). In a "drawout" information-gathering proceeding, a
party is entitled to the procedural protection of a section 120.57 hearing. If there is no disputed
issue of material fact, then the drawout hearing can take the form of an informal hearing. Id. §
120.57(2). In most cases where the "drawout" hearing request is successful there will be issues
concerning material facts in dispute and a formal hearing will need to be held. See id. §
120.57(1). Professor Dore has suggested the "drawout" formal hearing may be avoided if ad-
ministrative agencies make procedural accommodations to parties with interests at stake which
the "drawout" hearing is designed to protect. Dore, supra note 24, at 1003-09; see General Tel.
Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063, 1065-66 (Fla. 1984); Balino v. Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 362 So. 2d 21, 25-26 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (rejection of
request for "drawout" hearing must explain how the party's interests will be adequately pro-
tected by the procedures being used) cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 370
So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1979).
The legislature, by providing for the "drawout" procedure, preserved many of the procedural
protections which the federal courts attempted to impose on the informal rulemaking process at
the federal level before Vermont Yankee brought these innovations to a halt. See Vermont Yan-
kee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Scalia,
Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. Rav. 345.
26. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(a) (1989) (only a substantially affected person can request such a
hearing). See generally Agrico Chem. Co. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 365 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1978), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1979); see Dore, supra note 24, at 1009-18.
27. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(c) (1989).
28. Id. § 120.54(4)(d).
29. See id. § 120.68.
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conclusion of the separate proceeding, the rulemaking proceeding
shall be resumed)°
Administrative agencies also are opposed to using the rulemaking
process because of other requirements imposed by the APA, such as
the preparation of an economic impact statement3 and review by the
Joint Administrative Procedures Committee.3 2 All of these factors po-
tentially drive up an administrative agency's transaction costs when it
engages in the rulemaking process. Thus, from an administrative
agency's point of view, the APA-imposed constraints on the rulemak-
ing process are substantial disincentives which dictate that it avoid the
rulemaking process in developing public policy whenever possible.33
Professor Levinson prophetically commented shortly after the APA
was passed on the potential of administrative agencies adopting this
attitude toward the rulemaking process.
I do hope we have not imposed excessive burdens on the rulemaking
power of the agencies. If in fact we have done so, we are simply
tempting the agencies to abandon rulemaking as a means of
establishing policy; we are tempting them to develop their policy on
an ad hoc basis through adjudication of one case after another. This
would be a regrettable development at a time when the leading
scholars emphasize the need to encourage agencies to develop policy
by rulemaking rather than adjudication whenever feasible.3 4
As he predicted, administrative agencies responded to the disincen-
tives associated with the rulemaking process by seeking alternative
methods for developing public policy which circumvented some or all
30. Id. § 120.54(17) (emphasis added).
31. Id. § 120.54(2). See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Framat Realty,
Inc., 407 So. 2d 238, 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (declaring a rule invalid because it was not sup-
ported by an adequate economic impact statement).
32. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.52(4), .545 (1989).
33. See Hyde, supra note 21, at 2. My comments are not intended to indicate that public
participation in the rulemaking process is an evil to be avoided. Rather, they are descriptive of
why administrative agencies have avoided the process.
Sometimes private parties are as hostile to the rulemaking process as administrative agencies.
For example, a party may argue that administrative agencies must use adjudication as the
method for determining their interests without benefit of an administrative rule concerning the
subject matter. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063,
1069-70 (Fla. 1984).
34. Levinson, A Comparison of Florida Administrative Practice Under the Old and the
New Administrative Procedure Acts, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 72, 74 (1975).
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of the disincentives associated with the rulemaking process." In the
APA adjudicatory processes, administrative agencies found a method
for developing public policy which avoids many of the disincentives
associated with the rulemaking process. From the perspective of ad-
ministrative agencies, there are several advantages to developing pub-
lic policy through adjudicatory policy making 6 embodied in final
orders rather than in the rulemaking process. First, adjudication un-
der the APA is generally concerned only with the parties to the pro-
ceeding. 7 It is clear that not all persons or entities who may arguably
be affected by a public policy position established by an administra-
tive agency final order are entitled to participate in the adjudicatory
hearing as a party. 3 Further, when an administrative agency is en-
gaged in adjudication, there is only a very limited opportunity for
other interested persons or entities to intervene in the proceeding. 9
Thus, the number of persons or entities potentially eligible to partici-
pate in an adjudicatory hearing is substantially fewer as compared to
those who are potentially eligible to participate in the rulemaking
35. Of course, not all the disincentives attached to the rulemaking process are necessarily
found in the APA. At least one author has noted how the abandonment of the rulemaking
process in the federal system often has nothing to do with the structure imposed on that process
by the federal Administrative Procedure Act.
The failure to use rulemaking is far less a product of conscious departmental choice
than a result of impediments to the making of rules created by the Department's inter-
nal procedures. The channels which lead to rulemaking, and to a lesser extent other
forms of legislative policy statement ... are so clogged with obstacles, and the flow
through them so sluggish, that staff members hesitate to use them.
Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflec-
tions on the Interior Department's Administration of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. Rav. 1231,
1245 (1974).
36. The courts have often referred to public policy developed in the context of adjudication
as incipient rulemaking or nonrule policy. I have rejected the incipient rulemaking characteriza-
tion of the decision process because it suggests that at some point administrative agencies will
actually engage in rulemaking activity in the area when in fact that is a very rare occurrence.
Once administrative agencies have established public policy through adjudication they rarely
reestablish it by promulgating it through the rulemaking process. Accordingly, I will refer to the
decision process as adjudicatory policy making and the end results as nonrule policy.
37. In order to qualify as a party in a 120.57(1) hearing, a person's or entity's substantial
interests must be at stake before the administrative agency. See FLA. STAT. 120.52(12)(b), .57
(1989).
38. See generally Dore, supra note 24.
39. Unless the legislature has granted non-parties a right to participate in a section 120.57(1)
hearing, an administrative agency generally has the discretion to exclude non-parties from partic-
ipating in the adjudicatory hearing process. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(12)(b) (1989); FLA. STAT. §
120.57(l)(b)4 (1989); Suwannee River Area Council Boy Scouts of Am. v. Department of Com-
munity Affairs, 384 So. 2d 1369, 1373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Peterson v. Florida Dep't of
Comm'y Affairs, 386 So. 2d 879, 881 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). But see Bio-Medical Applications of
Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Serv., 370 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979); Bio-Medical Applications of Ocala, Inc. v. Office of Community Medical Facilities, 374
So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (comparative hearing situation).
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process.4 Second, when an administrative agency is engaged in adju-
dicatory policy-making, it does not have to file a small business eco-
nomic impact statement which is required when the rulemaking
process is used. 4' Third, when an administrative agency is engaged in
adjudicatory policy-making it does not have to subject its policy
choice to review by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. 42
Fourth, administrative agencies also believe that it is much cheaper to
develop public policy through adjudication rather than rulemaking. 43
Fifth, when an administrative agency chooses to develop public policy
through adjudication, it often is able to avoid thinking about the
problems associated with a substantive decision in a universal way. Its
primary concern in such cases is only with the development of public
policy to the extent of its immediate consequences to the parties.
From an administrative agency's perspective, it is often much easier to
deal with a small piece of a more general problem in the context of
adjudication rather than to develop a general public policy position to
deal with the problem as a whole."
Of course, there are disadvantages associated with developing pub-
lic policy through adjudication. First, the procedural protection avail-
40. See Florida Soc'y of Ophthalmology v. State Bd. of Optometry, 532 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.
1st DCA 1988), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1989). Compare FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(a)
(1989) with FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1989).
41. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(a) (1989).
42. See FLA. STAT. § 120.545 (1989); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of Business Reg-
ulation, 393 So. 2d 1177, 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Avoiding the possibility of being called to
account by the legislature for a policy choice it made is a powerful incentive for an administra-
tive agency not to offer such clear statements of its policy positions as are found in an adminis-
trative rule or proposed rule. See Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication - Rule Making Dilemma
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YAE L.J. 571 (1970) (noting that avoiding political
accountability was one of the primary reasons why the NLRB has not used its rule making
power). It is much easier to avoid this type of potential confrontation with the legislature if the
public policy position of the administrative agency remains only vaguely defined in a series of
often difficult to locate final orders. See infra text accompanying notes 145-151; cf Note, NLRB
Rulemaking: Political Reality Versus Procedural Fairness, 89 YM. L.J. 982, 995-96 (1980)
(commenting on why federal administrative agencies prefer adjudication for developing public
policy positions).
43. This conclusion is based on my discussions with several heads of administrative agencies
during the Seventh Administrative Law Conference. I am not sure their impressions of the rela-
tive cost of rulemaking compared to adjudicatory policy making is empirically correct, but it
clearly was a strongly held belief. Cf. Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Re-
form, 1985 DuKE L.J. 381 (commenting on the cost ineffectiveness of public participation in
some types of rulemaking). But see Pierce, The Choice Between Adjudicating and Rulemaking
for Formulating and Implementing Energy Policy, 31 HAsTOs L.J. 1 (1979) (commenting on
the excessive costs associated with developing public policy through adjudication).
44. By avoiding the large public policy issues at stake in dealing with a problem as a whole
and by using the piecemeal approach of the adjudicatory policy making process, an administra-
tive agency can often avert confronting conflicts within the administrative agency over policy
choices. See Strauss, supra note 35.
672 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:661
able in section 120.57 almost always applies to adjudicatory policy
making. The procedural protection offered by section 120.57(1) is
only available in very limited circumstances during the rulemaking
process. 45 Second, the hearing process which leads to a recommended
order is generally controlled by a hearing officer from the Division of
Administrative Hearings, not the administrative agency.46 This allows
a person outside the administrative agency to play a potentially deci-
sive role in shaping the nature of the record and the factual inferences
and conclusions to be drawn from the record. This may be fatal to an
administrative agency's policy preference, because in rendering its fi-
nal order an administrative agency has limited discretion to reject the
hearing officer's factual findings in the recommended order.4 7 Third,
during the judicial review process, the degree of judicial deference ac-
corded to administrative agency policy-making rendered in nonrule
orders is in theory substantially less than that granted to administra-
tive agency rulemaking. 4 But these disadvantages generally are not
45. See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(4)(a), (17) (1989); see supra note 25.
46. See FLA. STAT. § 120.65 (1989).
47. FLA. STAT. § 120.565(b)(10) (1989). The factual disputes concerning adjudicative facts
which are subject to normal methods of proof before the hearing officer "are generally binding
upon the [administrative] agency... and may not be disregarded unless the agency finds them
unsupported by competent substantial evidence." Manasota 88, Inc. v. Tremor, 545 So. 2d 439,
441 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (per curiam). This approach to the sufficiency of the factual record may
prevent an administrative agency from properly finding facts essential to establishing the validity
of its nonrule policy because the hearing officer rejected the administrative agency's position on
these factual questions. Barker v. Board of Medical Examiners, 428 So. 2d 720, 722-23 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1983). This limitation on the administrative agency's discretion can be fatal to its attempt
to establish a valid nonrule policy, for "when an agency elects to adopt incipient policy in a non-
rule proceeding, there must be an adequate support for its decision in the record of the proceed-
ing." Florida Cities Water Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 384 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla.
1980). Courts reviewing adjudicatory policy-making in this context may overturn an administra-
tive agency's decision because it improperly rejected the hearing officer's factual findings on
such issues. The courts have not hesitated to rigorously enforce this limitation on administrative
discretion. But this has not deterred administrative agencies from continuing to try to circumvent
this limitation on their discretion by labeling such factual disagreements between it and the hear-
ing officer as one not subject to normal methods of proof. E.g., Freeze v. Department of Busi-
ness Regulation, 556 So. 2d 1204, 1205-06 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (Judge Goshorn also discussed
this limitation on administrative agency discretion in his dissenting opinion.); Bajrangi v. De-
partment of Business Regulation, 561 So. 2d 410, 413-16 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (nature of penalty
imposed). The administrative agencies argue that factual disputes concern legislative facts that
are not subject to normal proof because they involve political-type judgments to which there are
no clear, correct answers. Administrative agencies, because of their special expertise, have the
authority to make the final judgment on legislative-type factual issues. The courts are much
more reluctant to accept this argument when the administrative agency is engaged in adjudica-
tory policy-making as compared to rulemaking. See Bowling v. Department of Ins., 394 So. 2d
165, 172-74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Burris, supra note 10, at 388-95.
48. Courts generally are more deferential in reviewing the validity of an administrative
agency's rule as compared to its final order. See General Tel. Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv.
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perceived by administrative agencies as sufficient cause for them to
abandon their practice of using adjudicatory proceedings as a means
of establishing nonrule policy. The result is that in practice adminis-
trative agencies have engaged in a plethora of public policy develop-
ment through adjudication.4 9 The net effect of this practice is that
administrative agencies have functionally forsaken the rulemaking
process in many important areas.50 And because so many of the non-
rule orders are not readily available to the public, it has caused many
parties subject to regulation by administrative agencies to characterize
the process as one of administration by ambush.
IV. THE McDONALD RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS POSED BY THE
RuLE/ORDER DICHOTOMY
The net result is that the burden of enforcing the rule/order dichot-
omy has fallen to the courts. The leading case addressing the role of
the courts in enforcing the rule/order dichotomy is McDonald v. De-
partment of Banking & Finance.5 McDonald is one of the most im-
portant administrative law cases ever decided by the Florida courts,
Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (Fla. 1984); Booker Creek Preservation, Inc. v. Southwest Fla.
Water Management Dist., 534 So. 2d 419, 422 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 1334
(Fla. 1989); Agrico Chem. Co. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 365 So. 2d 759, 762-63 (Fla.
Ist DCA 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Askew v. Agrico Chem. Co., 376 So. 2d (Fla. 1979).
49. It is currently impossible to state a precise figure concerning the number of administra-
tive agency orders in which adjudicatory policy-making has occurred. It is estimated that admin-
istrative agencies in Florida render between 100,000 and 450,000 final orders each year. See Fla.
S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., A Review of Indexing of Agency Orders Issued Pursuant to Chapter
120, F.S., The Administrative Procedure Act Report (1989 & Supp. 1990). Although no precise
number is available, based upon my conversations with government administrators and attorneys
in private practice, it is safe to assume that many of these final orders, perhaps as high as one-
half, can be viewed as establishing or relying on nonrule policy. See Waas, The Nightmare of
Nonrule Policy, 56 FiA. B.J. 193, 194 (1982) (noting the danger that "this judicially spawned
creature [will] devour the [rulemaking provisions of the] APA.").
50. I am not suggesting that administrative agencies have totally abandoned the rulemaking
process. Administrative agencies have constantly been engaged in rulemaking activity as figures
complied by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee indicate.
Year Number of Rules Promulgated
1985 4447
1986 4121
1987 3610
1988 3706
1989 4865
1990 2636
Memo from Joint Administrative Procedures Committee to Johnny C. Burris (on file with the
Florida State Law Review) (The figure for 1990 is through July 27, 1990); see Joint Administra-
tive Procedures Committee Annual Report January 1, 1989 - December 31, 1989.
51. 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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because it established the basic fundamentals of how the new APA
would be viewed by the judiciary. 2 A key aspect of the decision was
the legitimization of the use of adjudicatory policy-making through
administrative orders. 53 Since McDonald, the courts have as a practi-
cal matter treated the McDonald decision as authorizing administra-
tive agencies virtually complete discretion in choosing whether to
develop public policy through adjudication or rulemaking 4
The court in McDonald was reviewing the validity of the Depart-
ment of Banking and Finance's order s denying McDonald and others
a charter to organize and operate a bank in Port Richey. 56 The De-
partment's order was an interpretation or implementation of criteria
for the chartering of a bank, but the criteria had not been adopted
through the rulemaking process. As a result, the court was required to
explain when it was appropriate for a court to require an administra-
tive agency to adopt its public policy position through rulemaking and
when the administrative agency was free to continue developing its
public policy positions in the context of adjudication.
52. Pfeiffer, When is an Agency Required to Explicate Its Policies in Rules Adopted in
Accordance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes?, 11 ADNsm. L. SEC. NEWSL. 3 (March 1990).
53. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 580-83. The case also raised some other very interesting ques-
tions concerning the impact of the 1974 APA. See id. at 577 (constitutionality of the APA as
applied in this case), 578-79 (authority of an administrative agency to substitute its judgment for
those of the hearing officer concerning findings of fact).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 71-113.
55. The head of the Department of Banking and Finance is the Comptroller. While the
order was entered by the Department of Banking and Finance, the final decisions were made by
the Comptroller. Where appropriate, I have identified those substantive decisions which the
Comptroller made, but I have continued to refer to the order as one rendered by the Department
of Banking and Finance, the institution responsible for administering the banking laws. See FLA.
STAT. § 659.03 (1975); FLA. ADhaN. CODE ANN. r. 3C-20.05(5), 20.12 (1975).
56. The process by which the case reached the First District Court of Appeal is interesting
because the case arose during the transition period from the 1961 APA to the 1974 APA. They
had originally received conditional approval of their application, but when shortly thereafter the
new Comptroller took office, he promulgated an emergency rule authorizing revocation of all
conditionally approved applications. Cf. Lewis v. Judges of the Dist. Ct. of App., First Dist.,
322 So. 2d 16, 20-21 (Fla. 1975) (no emergency rule was required in order for the Comptroller to
void the conditionally approved applications). Using his authority under the emergency rules, the
Comptroller reviewed their application and ultimately denied it. After this decision was ren-
dered, the applicants for the bank charter requested and were ultimately granted a formal hear-
ing under section 120.57 of the 1974 APA which was conducted by a hearing officer from the
Division of Administrative Hearings. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 575 & n.4. In the recommended
order, the hearing officer made extensive findings of fact supporting her conclusion that the
applicants had satisfied the criteria for the granting of a charter to operate a bank. The Comp-
troller rejected four of these findings of fact and the conclusion that the applicants had satisfied
the criteria for the granting of a charter to operate a bank. Id. at 576-77. The court ultimately
reversed the order and remanded the case to the Department of Banking and Finance for further
proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. Id. at 586.
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The court acknowledged that the interpretations of the statutory
criteria found in the order could be viewed technically as a rule under
the APA.5 7 However, the court rejected a rigid, formalistic approach
to the problem and elected to read the APA as not requiring the adop-
tion of all rule-type policy statements through the rulemaking process.
"The APA does not chill the open development of policy by forbid-
ding all utterance of it except within the strict rulemaking proc-
ess .... "58 The court offered four compelling reasons for seeking a
middle ground on this issue. First, the court thought such a holding
would cause agency orders "to become arid, unreasoning edicts be-
cause explanation and interpretation, without rulemaking, would be
held fatal to the intended [administrative agency] action."5 9 Such a
result would obviously be disastrous for the adjudicatory process of
the APA by robbing it of the flexibility needed to explain why a par-
ticularly factual circumstance was or was not governed by a particular
administrative rule or statutory provision. 60 Second, it would deprive
the public of an important source of information concerning an ad-
ministrative agency's views on matters not yet dealt with in promul-
gated administrative rules and on administrative agency's views on the
purpose and scope of the administrative rules which have been prom-
ulgated. 6' Third, the court believed a rigid approach to this issue
would defeat the incremental development of public policy by an ad-
ministrative agency when it was unsure of what approach should be
used. This would undercut the logical development of public policy in
the administrative process.6 Finally, the court assumed that the public
would not be disadvantaged by the development of public policy in
adjudication, because all public policy choices developed through ad-
judication must be, just as rules are, "catalogued by a subject-matter
index [and] must be made available for inspection and copying by the
57. Id. at 580-81. The APA defines a rule as "each agency statement of general applicabil-
ity that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the organization, proce-
dure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes any form which imposes any
requirement or solicits any information not specifically required by statute or by an existing
rule." FLA. STAT. § 120.52(16) (1989).
58. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 580.
59. Id. at 581.
60. See id. at 582; FLA. STAT. § 120.68(12)(b)-(c) (1989) (requiring explanation of deviations
from established rules, policies, or practices); Levinson, The Florida Administrative Procedure
Act: 1974 Revision and 1975 Amendments, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 617, 650 (1975).
61. See Mcbonald, 346 So. 2d at 581.
62. "Agencies will hardly be encouraged to structure their discretion progressively by vague
standards, then definite standards, then broad principles, then rules if they cannot record and
communicate emerging policy ... without offending [the requirements found in] Section
120.54." Id. at 580. "[E]ven the agency that knows its policy may wisely sharpen its purposes
through adjudication before casting rules." Id. at 581 (emphasis in original).
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public in an ever-expanding library of precedents to which the agency
must adhere or explain its deviation." 63
While the court recognized there were legitimate reasons for not im-
posing a rigid approach to the issue of when an administrative agency
must use the rulemaking process, it also appreciated that there had to
be some limitation on the discretion of an administrative agency to
develop public policy through adjudication rather than rulemaking. 64
In McDonald, the court read the APA as having resolved these com-
peting interests by generally leaving administrative agencies free to de-
velop valid and enforceable public policy outside of the rulemaking
process in the context of administrative adjudication. 6 But the court
also noted that administrative agencies should be deprived of this dis-
cretion when the administrative decision concerned public "policy
statements of general applicability", i.e., those statements which are
intended by their own effect to create rights, or to require compliance,
or otherwise to have the direct and consistent effect of law" and
which can no longer be characterized as part of the incipient policy
development process." In such cases, the administrative agency must
promulgate its public policy choice through the rulemaking process.
The court apparently believed that this requirement would be essen-
tially self-enforcing, because administrative agencies would have sig-
nificant incentives for opting for the rulemaking process whenever
possible. First, administrative agencies would have to justify their
public policy positions by persuasively developing the factual and le-
gal arguments favoring their positions in the adjudicatory process in
order to adequately support a nonrule policy.6 7 This could, in some
cases, be as substantial a burden as developing policy through rule-
63. Id. at 582.
64. "Thus, the APA does not.., require agencies to make rules of their policy statements
of general applicability, nor does it explicitly invalidate action taken to effectuate policy state-
ments of that character which have not been legitimated by the rulemaking process. But that is
the necessary effect of the APA if the prescribed rulemaking procedures are not to be atrophied
by nonuse." Id. at 580.
65. Id. at 580-81.
66. Id. at 581. Even in this context the court found that the APA permitted an administra-
tive agency to pursue both rulemaking and adjudicatory activity simultaneously. The court as-
sumed that if adjudicatory activity disclosed a need for rulemaking action, then it could be
undertaken without terminating the current adjudicatory process. Id. at 581-82; see Reporter's
Comments, supra note 8, at 6.
67. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 582. The court viewed this process as functionally equivalent
to or a substitute for the rulemaking processes mandated by section 120.54, because it provides
"a forum to expose, inform and challenge agency policy and discretion" just as section 120.54
was designed to do. Id. at 583 (quoting State ex rel. Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Willis, 344 So. 2d
580, 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)).
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making." Second, and more significantly, even after the administra-
tive agency had established a public policy position through
adjudication, it could not consistently rely upon it as binding prece-
dent. Adjudicatory policy positions were always vulnerable to attack
in a subsequent adjudicatory proceeding. 69 In such cases, the adminis-
trative agency would have to vindicate its public policy choice again.
The scheme developed in McDonald authorized adjudicatory pol-
icy-making, but the court also believed that important institutional in-
centives existed to check the improper exploitation of this process. It
is also important to note that the court asserted that if these institu-
tional constraints did not adequately protect the balance established in
the APA between rulemaking and adjudication in the development of
public policy, then the courts must intervene to require administrative
agencies to engage in rulemaking activity to legitimate public policy
choices made by administrative agencies of general applicability.
V. THE FAILURE OF THE McDONALD VISION FOR RESOLUTION OF THE
PROBLEMS POSED BY THE RULE/ORDER DICHOTOMY
As Justice Holmes observed long ago "[tihe life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience." 70 The beautiful logical design envi-
sioned by Judge Smith in his McDonald opinion interpreting the APA
has not come to pass.71 Our experiences post-McDonald have not fol-
68. Administrative agencies will be required to defend adjudicatory policy-making positions
by conventional proof methods:
[This requirement,] in appropriate cases, subjects agency policymakers to the sobering
realization their policies lack convincing wisdom, and requires them to cope with the
hearing officer's adverse commentary [and factual findings].
... The final order must display the agency's rationale. It must address countervail-
ing arguments developed in the record and urged by a hearing officer's recommended
findings and conclusions or by a party's written challenge of agency rationale in infor-
mal proceedings, or by proposed findings submitted to the agency by a party.
McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 583.
69. When an administrative agency relies on a public policy position established in adjudi-
cation, then it "is fair game for a party's challenge both in the public and in his private inter-
est ..... Id.
70. O. HoLtEs, THE CoMMoN LAW 1(1881).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 51-69. The federal courts have experienced similar
difficulties in trying to enforce the preference for the rulemaking process. Compare SEC v. Che-
nery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) and Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) with NLRB v. Wy-
man-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969) and NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974);
see also Mayton, supra note 20. "[Federal c]ourts rarely strike down an adjudicative rule on the
ground that it should have been created legislatively [through the rulemaking process]." Weaver,
Chenery II: A Forty- Year Retrospective, 40 ADmI. L. Rav. 161, 163 (1988).
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lowed the logic of the decision. 72 In fact, the post-McDonald cases
have demonstrated that the institutional checks identified in Mc-
Donald have been ineffective. Furthermore, the courts have not inter-
vened to require administrative agencies to engage in rulemaking
rather than adjudication in developing legally binding public policy,
or absent such intervention, developed other incentives or disincen-
tives sufficient to encourage administrative agencies to engage in rule-
making. This has resulted in the development, by many administrative
agencies, of a large body of virtually unknown law. 73 This state of
affairs may be accounted for by the fact that the courts have failed to
understand the fundamental nature of the collapse of the McDonald
vision and the need for a renewed effort by the judiciary to resort the
balance established by the APA between developing public policy
through the rulemaking process and in adjudicatory proceedings.
It is important to note that in offering this criticism of the decisions
rendered by the courts in attempting to enforce the rule/order dichot-
omy I am not suggesting that the courts have abjured all application
of the restraints on administrative agency choice between rulemaking
and adjudication envisioned by McDonald.74 There are three catego-
72. Some early cases, decided for the most part contemporaneously with McDonald, indi-
cated that the courts were willing to impose restrictions on administrative agency discretion when
the institutional checks failed. For example in State Dep't of Administration v. Stevens, the
court held, in part, that the Department of Administration's directive and the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services' guidelines both were "clearly ... agency policy statements
of general applicability . .. [and] not having been legally adopted and promulgated as rules
[were] therefore void and of no effect." 344 So. 2d 290, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In Department
of Revenue v. U.S. Sugar Corp., the court held that a policy statement interpreting the scope of
statutory language originally found in a tax audit statement was a rule not adopted through the
rulemaking process. The court rejected the argument by the Department of Revenue that it had
validly adopted the tax audit policy position through adjudicatory policy-making in the context
of U.S. Sugar Corporation's section 120.56 challenge to the tax audit statement. 388 So. 2d 596,
598 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). See also Mental Health Dist. Bd., II-B v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Servs., 425 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (disapproving of the use of a
declaratory statement rather than rulemaking to state policy); State v. Harvey, 356 So. 2d 323
(Fla. 1st DCA 1978); North Miami Gen. Hosp. v. Office of Community Medical Facilities, 355
So. 2d 1272, 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Price Wise Buying Group v. Nuzum, 343 So. 2d 115, 116
(Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (disapproving of the use of a declaratory statement rather than rulemaking
to state policy); Florida Dep't of Offender Rehabilitation v. Walsh, 352 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1977) (per curiam).
73. See Waas, supra note 49; Hyde, supra note 21, at 2-3.
74. Clearly the language in some opinions does suggest such a conclusion. See, e.g., City of
Tallahassee v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 433 So. 2d 505, 508 (Fla. 1983) ("[A]lthough codifi-
cation is ultimately desirable, this Court will not compel the PSC to adopt formal rules .... ");
Barker v. Board of Medical Examiners, 428 So. 2d 720, 722, 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) ("It
obviously would have been preferable for the Board to have expressed its policy by the adoption
of a new rule."). There are virtually no post-McDonald decisions which have required an admin-
istrative agency to engage in rulemaking activity in order to enforce its policy choices. See Floria
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ries of cases where it is fairly clear the courts are willing to enforce the
rule/order dichotomy in public policy decision-making. These are
practically the only examples of when the McDonald paradigm was
effectively used by courts as a real, rather than illusory, check on ad-
ministrative agency discretion. Regrettably, the utility of these cases is
severely constrained by the unusual circumstances which probably
limited their usefulness to their unique facts.
First, the courts have not permitted an administrative agency to use
the adjudicatory policy making process to directly contravene an ad-
ministrative rule which was promulgated through the rulemaking
process. 7 In Gar-Con Development, Inc. v. State,76 the court was re-
viewing an order by the Department of Environmental Regulation
which expanded its rule concerning dredging to include pile driving. 77
The court held that the Department of Environmental Regulation
could not accomplish the functional modification of an existing ad-
ministrative rule using this method. The court found that the Depart-
ment of Environmental Regulation was prohibited from using orders
rendered in the adjudicatory process to develop a policy position di-
rectly contrary to its own properly promulgated rule defining dredg-
ing. A policy shift in this circumstance must be carried out through
the rulemaking process. 78 The court used the McDonald paradigm in
reaching this result.
One of the principal objectives of the Administrative Procedure Act
is to prevent state [administrative] agencies from adopting
unpromulgated and often unwritten policies that are to be generally
applied and that affect persons regulated by the agency or having a
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. indiantown Tel. Sys., Inc., 435 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Rather, courts have found the record did not adequately support the adjudicatory policy-making
activity in the order. See, e.g., Florida Cities Water Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 384 So.
2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 1980); Anheuser.Busch, Inc., 393 So. 2d at 1183.
75. If the action of the administrative agency is merely a permissible interpretation of an
existing rule, then it is perfectly valid. See C.H. Barco Contracting Co. v. State, 483 So. 2d 796,
799-801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (per curiam). But if such an interpretation does not renounce the
prior rule, but is nonetheless a rather radical departure from prior understandings of the mean-
ing of a rule, then it may still run afoul of retroactivity concerns. See id. at 801-04 (Booth, C.J.,
dissenting).
76. 468 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied sub nom. Department of Envt'l Regula-
tion v. Gar-Con Dev. Inc., 479 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1985).
77. Pile driving was clearly an action not covered under the administrative rule for dredg-
ing.
78. 468 So.2d at 415. Cf. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). A potential problem with the Gar-Con Development deci-
sion is that it may be inconsistent with the provisions of the APA which implicitly authorize an
administrative agency to act inconsistent with a prior established policy as long as it adequately
explained its shift. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(12)(c) (1989).
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substantial interest in the policy. Another objective is to prevent
agencies from changing such policies at will without notice or
without following formal rulemaking procedures. 79
The court explicitly rejected the claim that this administrative order
was a form of mere interpretation of the scope of the administrative
rule.80 The court correctly recognized that if this argument was permit-
ted to succeed it would as Justice Boyd state in Florida Cities Water
Co., "allow every agency total discretion in deciding whether to use
rulemaking procedures in implementing changes in policy ... [by
claiming] it is reinterpreting the law.""'
Second, the courts have indicated they will not permit administra-
tive agencies to exercise their discretion to select adjudication as a
mode of policy development when the legislature has clearly expressed
its intention that an administrative agency develop its public policy
positions in an area only through the rulemaking process. In Evans
Packing Co. v. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services,8 2
the court reviewed the validity of the Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services' attempt to enforce restrictions on the presence of
pulp wash solid in orange juice without adopting standards concern-
ing this matter through the rulemaking process as directed by the leg-
islature. In 1949, the legislature passed legislation directing the
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services to promulgate
rules concerning methods for testing citrus products for the presence
of pulp wash solids . 3 Rather than adopt an administrative rule con-
cerning this matter the Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services chose to impose a testing procedure standard developed in an
adjudicatory proceeding. The court held that when an agency has
been directed by statute to establish public policy by administrative
rules, such as the testing procedure at issue in this case, then the ad-
ministrative agency cannot escape this statutory requirement by devel-
oping policy in adjudicatory proceedings. Any attempt to do so is an
ultra vires act, clearly beyond the scope of authority delegated to the
79. 468 So. 2d at 414.
80. "By no stretch of the imagination can pile driving mean dredging or excavating nor is
that a reasonable an permissible interpretation of the word dredging." Id. at 415. But see id.
(Wentworth, J., dissenting). Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hickel, 435 F.2d 440, 444-45 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(discussion of the problem of limiting the scope of interpretation).
81. Florida Cities Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 384 So. 2d 1280, 1283 (Fla. 1980)
(Boyd , J., dissenting).
82. 550 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
83. See FLA. STAT. §§ 601.24, 601.25 (1989).
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administrative agency by the legislature. The cases where the courts
have authorized case by case development of scientific testing stan-
dards were distinguishable because in those cases there was no statu-
tory requirement that the agency adopt a test by administrative rule. 5
The court went on to note in dicta that the method used to detect the
presence of pulp wash solids was not even a valid form of adjudica-
tory policy making.8 6 This approach obviously checks administrative
agency discretion in the area of adjudicatory policy making, but it is
limited to when the legislature has done so, a rare circumstance.8 7
Third, the courts will not permit an administrative agency to an-
nounce a policy choice with legal effect when it has not used either the
rulemaking or adjudicatory process. 8 Obviously these cases raise a
different fundamental question. Can agencies develop legally binding
policies outside the context of rulemaking and adjudication? The
courts seem to have answered that question with a resounding no.
Public Service Commission v. Central Corporation9 is typical of the
decisions which have addressed this problem. In that case the Public
Service Commission sua sponte issued an administrative orderP which
required alternative operator service providers to "hold subject to re-
fund all revenues collected by those providers which exceeded the
most comparable local exchange rate." 91 The Public Service Commis-
sion was concerned that the rates being charged by alternative opera-
tor service providers were excessive and not in the public interest.
84. "[W]e know of no authority for allowing an agency to use a disputed testing method as
the basis for imposition of severe disciplinary penalties when that test has not been adopted in a
rulemaking proceeding as explicitly required by statute." Evans, 550 So. 2d at 120-21; Cf. Bur-
ris, 1988 Survey of Florida Law, Administrative Law 13 NovA L. Rv. 727, 734-36 (1989); Bur-
ris, supra note 10, at 316-22 (discussion of ultra vires doctrine).
85. Evans, 550 So. 2d at 120-21.
86. The court found the test used was not sufficiently reliable to satisfy the clear and con-
vincing burden of persuasion for establishing adjudicatory policy making in a licensing case. The
test used would detect even de minimis amounts of pulp wash solids and had not been accepted
in the scientific community as reliable. The testimony at the hearing established that the pulp
wash solids detected by the test used could have a variety of sources and need not be the result of
adulteration of the orange juice. Id. at 120.
87. See Hyde, supra note 21, at 4.
88. See Department of Corrections v. Piccirillo, 474 So. 2d 1199, 1201-02 (Fla. 1st DCA
1985) (per curiam); Department of Corrections v. Adams, 458 So. 2d 354, 356 (Fla. 1st DCA
1984); Enterprise Bldg. Corp. v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 445 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1984) (per curiam); Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering,
407 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
89. 551 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
90. The Public Service Commission characterized its order as an interim rate order issued in
response to numerous complaints that alternative operator service providers were charging exces-
sive rates. Prior to the issuance of this order, the rates charged by alternative operator service
providers had not been regulated by the Public Service Commission. Id. at 569.
91. Id.
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Central Corporation, an alternative operator service provider, in an
administrative proceeding claimed the order was an invalid rule be-
cause it was not promulgated through the rulemaking process. 92 The
court held, in part, that the Public Service Commission's order was an
invalid rule. Under the APA a rule is any agency "statement of gen-
eral applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or pol-
icy . . . . 9 The Public Service Commission's order met these
requirements. The general applicability requirement was satisfied, be-
cause the order was applicable to all alternative operator service provi-
ders in Florida. The order also implemented, interpreted and
proscribed policy by imposing a new obligation, one which did not
exist prior to the issuance of the order. The court found the fact the
order was intended to remain in effect for only a brief period of time
did not alter the result. "However, a temporally limited agency action
is properly denominated a rule if it has the consistent effect of law,
that is, is consistently applicable throughout its existence to an entire
group rather than to one member of that group.' 94 The court rejected
the claim that this order was a valid nonrule policy, because the Pub-
lic Service Commission had not offered the alternative operator serv-
ice providers a point of entry in its decision process before it
announced its order. The Public Service Commission did not hold a
formal or informal hearing necessary to the development of the record
to support a nonrule policy. It just announced its order. By failing to
provide a hearing the Public Service Commission acted beyond the
scope of the adjudicatory policy making doctrine. The Public Service
Commission must follow one of the two courses available for develop-
ing policy, either rulemaking or adjudication. There is no other valid
means for the development of legally enforceable policy. 95
These three categories of decisions only concern a small fraction of
the nonrule orders rendered by administrative agencies. There is no
reason to question the results in these types of cases, but because of
their unusual factual and legal setting they do not help us with the
problem of when courts should require rather than merely encourage
administrative agencies to use rulemaking rather than adjudication in
developing public policy positions in more typical settings.
92. Id. at 569-70; see FLA. STAT. § 364.14(1) (1987).
93. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(16) (1989).
94. Central Corp., 551 So. 2d at 570 (citing Balsam v. Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Serv., 452 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)).
95. See Central Corp., 551 So. 2d at 571; Amos v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative
Servs., 444 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). See generally, Health Care and Retirement Corp. v.
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 559 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (point
of entry requirement).
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It remains true that in the vast majority of cases the courts continue
to ritualistically adhere to the distinctions drawn in the McDonald de-
cision as if they will become self-enforcing if they are repeated often
enough. 96 In the process of doing so, the courts have continually re-
minded agencies that it is generally preferable to develop policy
through the rulemaking rather than the adjudication process. 97 In fact,
outside of the factually unique settings of the three categories of cases
discussed above, the courts have not attempted to enforce the rule/
order dichotomy or create new incentives for agencies to develop pub-
lic policy through rules in the rulemaking process or disincentives for
using the adjudicatory process to create nonrule orders. The courts
have continued, with but a very few exceptions, to approve virtually
all of the policy developments which have occurred in the adjudica-
tion process. The result is that agencies functionally have unlimited
discretion in determining how to proceed in developing public policy
because the courts have failed to effectively use the judicial review
process to channel the public policy development of administrative
agencies into the rulemaking process. 98 One committee in the legisla-
ture has concluded that the courts have "effectively established adju-
dication as an alternative to rulemaking." 99
Illustrative of the cases adhering to the form of McDonald with no
substantive bite are City of Tallahassee v. Public Service
Commission'00 and Rolling Oaks Utilities v. Public Service Commis-
sion.1°1 In City of Tallahassee, the Florida Supreme Court noted that
in formulating policy an "administrative agenc[y] may develop poli-
cies by adjudication and that formal rulemaking is not initially neces-
96. See Hill v. School Bd. of Leon County, 351 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert.
denied 359 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1978). At least one court has suggested that the APA preference for
rulemaking should be treated as only a self-enforcing limitation on administrative agency discre-
tion, because of the deference courts should extend to the executive branch in choosing how it
should develop public policy positions. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of Business Regula-
tion, 393 So. 2d 1177, 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
97. "Administrative agencies are not required to institute rulemaking procedures each time
a new policy is developed ... although that form of proceeding is preferable where established
industry-wide policy is being altered." Florida Cities Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 384
So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 1980) (citations omitted). But see Id. at 1281-3 (Boyd, J., concurring and
dissenting).
98. See, e.g., Anheuser-Bush, 393 So. 2d at 1181-82.
99. House Committee on Governmental Operations, Staff Analysis and Economic Impact
Statement Report on House Bill 2539 5 (1990); see also House Committee on Governmental
Operations, Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement Report on House BIll 91-1879
(1991).
100. 433 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1983).
101. 533 So. 2d 770 modkried on reh'g, 533 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (facts of the case
clarified).
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sary in all cases."'02 An agency can choose "to exercise its authority
on a case-by-case basis until it has focused on a common scheme of
inquiry derived through experience gained from adversary proceed-
ings." 0 3 But once a policy position has been established, then it
"should be codified . . . [as a] rule."'' 4 As with most cases of this
type the Florida Supreme Court saw no reason for requiring the Pub-
lic Service Commission to engage in rulemaking activity at this time.10 5
Similarly, in Rolling Oaks Utilities the First District Court of Appeal
reaffirmed that agencies may create legally enforceable public policy
through the case by case adjudicatory process in a series of nonrule
orders. 106 The court noted that in Florida, adjudicatory public policy
making is limited to circumstances where an agency has not yet settled
on an approach to a problem and wants to preserve its freedom to
experiment with possible solutions.107 In both these cases the reviewing
court simply unquestioningly accepted the administrative agency's as-
sertion that it had not yet settled on a policy concerning how to judge
the validity of a rate surcharge.108
The common theme in all the cases like City of Tallahassee and
Rolling Oaks Utilities is that after noting the McDonald-based limita-
tion on the scope of administrative agency discretion to chose adjudi-
catory policy making over rulemaking, the courts then went on to
hold that the adjudicatory public policy developed in an administra-
tive agency's nonrule order was valid and functionally enforceable as
if it had been adopted as a rule. 19 These decisions are typical of the
overwhelming majority of decisions discussing this issue. They all fol-
low the standard form of noting that there are limits on the discretion
of administrative agencies in this area, but they were not transgressed
102. City of Tallahassee, 433 So. 2d at 508 (emphasis added). The court noted once again
that it preferred for administrative agencies to use the rulemaking process when the public poli-
cies will have an industry wide impact. Id.
103. Id. at 507.
104. Id.
105. The court has indicated in other cases that it applies the abuse of discretion standard of
judicial review in determining whether an administrative agency improperly developed public
policy in an adjudicatory proceeding. City of Tallahassee v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 441 So. 2d
620, 623 (Fla. 1983).
106. Rolling Oaks Utilities, 533 So. 2d at 773-74.
107. Id. at 774.
108. Id.; City of Tallahassee, 433 So. 2d at 507-08.
109. City of Tallahassee, 433 So. 2d at 507-08; Rolling Oaks Utilities, 533 So. 2d at 774. This
is not always the case. While the courts almost uniformly legitimate an administrative agency's
decision to develop public policy in a nonrule order, on some occasions courts have held a non-
rule order invalid because the administrative agency failed to provide sufficient factual support
or legal justification in support of the order. See, e.g., St. Francis Hosp., Inc. v. Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 553 So. 2d 1351, 1354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); General Develop-
ment Corp. v. Division of State Planning, 353 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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in this particular case. Sometimes the courts even make these state-
ments in a rather ominous tone. "If an agency neglects its rulemaking
power and attempts to promulgate policy of general applicability on
an ad hoc basis by orders in particular cases, we must order rulemak-
ing as a predicate for further action and, if necessary, invalidate
agency action taken without rulemaking."" 0 Despite the tone, the de-
cisions addressing the rule/order dichotomy issue remain classic exam-
ples of form being mistaken for substance.
For example, even when the courts appear to be critically evaluating
the validity of an administrative agency choosing to develop public
policy through adjudication, the decisions still lacks any substantive
bite. In a few cases the courts have mentioned, but thus far not actu-
ally used, two circumstances where they would intervene to require an
administrative agency to exercise its discretion in developing public
policy only in the context of the rulemaking process. First, when an
administrative agency is imposing a new policy which has an industry-
wide impact in an area which under its anterior policy was unregu-
lated, the courts have indicated that an administrative agency may be
required to use the rulemaking process."' Second, when an adminis-
trative agency will be imposing "severe and judicially unreviewable
penalties for violation of a statutory norm [not commonly understood
and] made explicit only by the disciplinary order," a form of retro-
spective policy making, the administrative agency may be required to
use the rulemaking process to impose the new public policy posi-
tion.12 In these two circumstances the courts have suggested that if an
administrative agency failed to use the rulemaking process, then it
may well constitute a material error affecting the fairness of the pro-
ceedings."' But these constraints on administrative discretion in the
rule/order dichotomy remain merely empty threats, because the courts
have yet to find a circumstance where an administrative agency has
violated them.
VI. THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS POSED By THE RuLE/ORDER
DICHOTOMY SUGGESTED BY ADAM SMITH
In Adam Smith Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Regulation"4 the court indicated that the standard of judicial review
110. General Development, 353 So. 2d at 1209.
111. Florida Cities Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 384 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 1980);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 393 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1981).
112. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 393 So. 2d at 1181.
113. Id. at 1182.
114. 553 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
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applied in evaluating the validity of a rule depends on how the issue
reached the courts. If judicial review is conducted pursuant to an ap-
peal from an agency rule adopted using the informal rulemaking pro-
cedures," 5 then the standard of judicial review is arbitrary and
capricious. 1,6 This is a less stringent standard of judicial review for the
factual record than the competent substantial evidence standard which
is applied in the review of adjudicatory decisions.'7
The court noted that the nature of the judicial review process is fun-
damentally altered by the standard of judicial review applied.
We believe that under th[e] arbitrary and capricious standard ... an
agency is ... subjected only to the ... command of rationality. The
reviewing court is not authorized to examine whether a rulemaker's
empirical conclusions have support in substantial evidence. Rather,
the arbitrary and capricious standard requires an inquiry into the
basic orderliness of the rulemaking process, and authorizes the
courts to scrutinize the actual making of a rule for signs of blind
prejudice or inattention to crucial facts. [This requires] the reviewing
court [to] consider whether the agency: (1) has considered all relevant
factors; (2) has given actual, good faith consideration to those
factors; and (3) has used reason rather than whim to progress from
consideration of these factors to its final decision."18
However, if judicial review of an administrative agency rule arises out
of the context of adjudicatory proceedings held during the rulemaking
process," 9 then the agency's quasi-legislative rulemaking process is
converted into an adjudicatory process and the standard of judicial
review for factual conclusions supporting the rule is the competent
substantial evidence standard.'12 This shift in the standard of judicial
review occurrs because the hearing officer's factual conclusions be-
come the basic record for the court to review.'2'
Applying this paradigm to the procedures used by the Department
of Environmental Regulation in Adam Smith, the court concluded
that the appropriate standard of judicial review in this case was the
competent substantial evidence standard because this case reached the
court on appeal from an adjudicatory proceeding held during the rule-
115. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3) (1989).
116. Adam Smith Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 553 So. 2d
1260, 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
117. Id. at 1271-72.
118. Id. at 1273.
119. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(4), 120.56 (1989).
120. Adam Smith, 553 So. 2d at 1273-74; see FLA. STAT. § 120.68(10) (1989).
121. Adam Smith, 553 So. 2d at 1274.
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making process.' The court in a bare conclusion stated that after re-
viewing the record it found that the substantial competent evidence
standard of judicial review was satisfied in this case. 23
If the court is correct about the variable standard of judicial review
in the rulemaking context,12 then the potential for a two tier judicial
review process creates a new incentive for administrative agencies to
develop public policy through the rulemaking process rather than ad-
judication. The type of record created in a formal adjudicatory
proceeding 21 is similar to that created by in adjudicatory hearing held
during the rulemaking process. Clearly the substantial competent evi-
dence standard of judicial review applies to factual determinations
made during the adjudicatory process which resulted in a nonrule or-
der. Thus, under Adam Smith, an administrative agency may be in-
duced to use the rulemaking process because as long as the rulemaking
process does not involve an adjudicatory hearing, then any rule prom-
ulgated will be reviewed by a court under the less stringent "arbitrary
and capricious" standard. Though the variable standard of judicial
review creates a substantial incentive for an agency to use the rule-
making process for policy development, there are three problems with
the Adam Smith approach which will prevent it from effectively en-
couraging administrative agencies to use the rulemaking process.
First, an agency can be dragged into the adjudicatory mode of judi-
cial review by a party successfully invoking its right to a hearing under
several provisions of the APA.'2 Thus, an administrative agency can
be deprived of the incentive for using the rulemaking process because
of circumstances beyond its control. The uncertainty over the stan-
dard of judicial review that may ultimately be applied will offset any
chance that the Adam Smith decision will encourage administrative
agencies to self-select the rulemaking process rather than adjudicatory
process for developing public policy positions.
Second, the two tier approach to the judicial review of factual is-
sues may apply to nonrule orders. When an administrative agency has
held an adjudicatory type hearing during the rulemaking process it
does not change the nature of its decision. The actions of the adminis-
trative agency remain quasi-legislative in nature.'1 In such cases the
standard of judicial review applied by the courts should retain its very
122. Id. at 1262, 1275; see FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4) (1989).
123. Adam Smith, 553 So. 2d at 1275.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 126-39.
125. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1) (1989).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 25-33.
127. See General Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (Fla.
1984).
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deferential nature' 28 because the administrative agency was still en-
gaged in making legislative type factual judgments during the adjudi-
catory type hearing.12 An adjudicatory type hearing held during the
rulemaking process is purely information gathering in nature and de-
signed to assist the administrative agency in making legislative-type
factual judgments. It is not designed to adjudicate factual issues or
the rights of parties. 30 If an administrative agency is engaged in a ru-
lemaking "drawout" hearing, the nature of the hearing more closely
resembles the adversary process associated with quasi-judicial decision
making in the adjudicatory process. In a "drawout" hearing, the
characteristics of process have changed because there is an adjudica-
tory record designed to assist a party in preserving rights which would
not have been adequately protected during the normal rulemaking
process. Arguably, it may be appropriate in such cases for a reviewing
court to apply the competent substantial evidence test to administra-
tive agency factual judgments because the court has an adversarial
type factual record concerning some factual issues. But the nature of
the rulemaking process has not changed; it still concerns legislative-
type factual judgments. Such factual judgments are a matter within
the policy discretion of the administrative agency.' All that has
changed is the nature of the process used in gathering the facts neces-
sary for making such an informed choice concerning legislative type
factual issues. This should not convert a rulemaking proceeding into
an adjudicatory process and change the standard of judicial review.3 2
This point of view is supported by the decision in Agrico Chemical
Company v. Department of Environmental Regulation.133 In Agrico
Chemical, the court found that the holding of a section 120.54(4) rule
challenge hearing did not convert the basic nature of the administra-
tive agency's activity, which was promulgating an administrative
rule. 134 In such cases the perspective for judicial review remains the
128. See Brewester Phosphates v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 444 So. 2d 483, 486
(Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (reverse administrative agency judgments only for "flagrant abuse of dis-
cretion").
129. See generally 2 K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 12:3-12:8 (2d ed. 1979)
(legislative and adjudicatory facts distinguished).
130. General Tel. Co. of Fla., 446 So. 2d at 1067; Balino v. Department of Health & Reha-
bilitative Servs., 362 So. 2d 21, 24-25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
131. See Groves-Watkins Constructors v. Department of Transp., 511 So. 2d 323, 328 (Fla.
1st DCA 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 530 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1988); Burris, supra note 10, at
388-95.
132. Cf. Balino v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 362 So. 2d 21, 25-6 (Fla.
1st DCA 1978).
133. 365 So. 2d 759, 762-66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1979).
134. Id. at 762-63.
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same: very deferential to the judgments of the administrative agency.
Courts should affirm the validity of the administrative rule as long as
the discretion exercised by the administrative agency was a reasoned
one, not arbitrary or capricious, and "based upon competent substan-
tial evidence. Competent substantial evidence... [is] such evidence as
a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion."' In the evaluation of the record to determine whether suffi-
cient substantial competent evidence exists, the courts have
consistently maintained that an administrative agency can resolve con-
flicts in the evidence independent of the hearing officer as long as it
concerns matters which were "infused by policy considerations for
which the agency has special responsibility ... ."136 This diminishes
the significance of the factual findings by hearing officers concerning
policy matters or legislative facts. 3 7 If the factual findings by the
hearing officer concern adjudicatory facts, not legislative facts, then
the administrative agencies must defer to these factual judgments and
can not reject them.3 8 To the extent the factual judgments made by a
hearing officer in either a rule making hearing or a nonrule policy
adjudicatory hearing involve legislative facts the same standard of ju-
dicial review should apply in both circumstances, because the adminis-
trative agency is still exercising its quasi-legislative type authority.
Third and most importantly, the deferential standard of judicial re-
view used in the rulemaking context has been in place for a number of
years. 13 9 During that time administrative agencies have continued to
135. Id. at 763.
136. McDonald v. Department of Banking and Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 579 (lst DCA 1977).
137. See Bowling v. Department of Ins., 394 So. 2d 165, 171 & n.9 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
138. See id. at 174-75; Koltaty v. Division of Gen. Regulation, 374 So. 2d 1386, 1391 (Fla.
2d DCA 1979).
139. Although several courts including the Florida Supreme Court have approved of a two
tier system of judicial review similar to that discussed in Adam Smith, it is not at all clear that
the APA authorizes a two tier standard of judicial review. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (Fla. 1984); Booker Creek Preservation, Inc. v. Southwest
Fla. Water Management Dist., 534 So. 2d 419, 422 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Agrico Chemical Co.
v. Department of Envt'l. Regulation, 365 So. 2d 759, 762.63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). The compe-
tent substantial evidence standard of judicial review for factual issues found in section
120.68(10) clearly applies to formal and informal hearings under section 120.57. The process
used in the informal proceeding under section 120.57(2) creates a record which is remarkably
similar to the type of record generated in an informal rulemaking process when no adjudicatory
type hearing was held. The facts are found in a proceeding which functionally meets the require-
ments of section 120.57. If this is true, then the courts should apply the competent substantial
evidence standard to informal rulemaking. Arguably, this judicial attempt to create a rulemaking
incentive is invalid because the court has imposed a judicial review scheme (similar to that found
in the federal Administrative Procedure Act) which the structure of the APA does not support.
In doing so, the court in Adam Smith functionally amended the nature of the judicial review
process set forth in section 120.68. This is more properly a matter for the legislature, rather than
the courts, to consider and adopt.
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use the adjudicatory policy making process rather than the rulemaking
process. The significant advantage enjoyed by administrative agencies
under the more deferential standard of judicial review has not induced
them to use it more often.
VII. SOME POLICY REASONS FOR WHY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
SHOULD NOT GENERALLY BE PERMITTED To DEVELOP PUBLIC POLICY
THROUGH ADJUDICATION
Even if there has been a general failure on the part of the courts to
enforce the rule/order dichotomy, the question remains whether this
is a significant problem in the administrative process. Why should the
courts and the other branches of the government care whether admin-
istrative agencies develop public policy through rulemaking or adjudi-
catory processes? If administrative agencies prefer one process to
another for developing public policy there is no harm as long as ad-
ministrative agencies are still performing their functions. A short re-
sponse to this attitude is that there are significant problems associated
with administrative agencies coming to rely on nonrule orders to es-
tablish public policy. There are at least five significant problems with
permitting administrative agencies to have virtual carte blanche au-
thority to choose the adjudicatory policy making process over the ru-
lemaking process.'4 Both as a group and individually, these problems
provide a justification for the courts requiring administrative agencies
to use the rulemaking process rather than the adjudicatory policy
making process.
First, the use of adjudicatory policy making significantly limits who
can participate in the policy making process. One of the purposes of
the APA was to open up the relatively hidden and inaccessible deci-
sion processes of administrative agencies to more public participa-
tion. 14' When an administrative agency engages in rulemaking, any
140. There are other arguments against adjudicatory policy making process; the general ap-
proval of adjudicatory policy making by the courts has diluted the nature of the check on ad-
ministrative agency discretion offered by the section 120.56 hearing. "Any person substantially
affected by a rule may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the rule on the
ground that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority." FLA. STAT. §
120.56(1) (1989). By using the adjudicatory policy making process administrative agencies have
functionally nullified the purpose of the section 120.56 which only restricts the administrative
rulemaking process. Waas, supra note 49.
141. Reporter's Comments, supra note 8, at 5; see also Gar-Con Development, Inc. v. De-
partment of Environmental Regulation, 468 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) ("One of the
principal objectives of the Administrative Procedure Act is to prevent state agencies from adopt-
ing unpromulgated and often unwritten policies that are to be generally applied and that affect
persons regulated by the agency or having a substantial interest in the policy. Another objective
is to prevent agencies from changing such policies at will without notice or without following
formal rulemaking procedures."); State ex rel. Dep't of Gen. Serv. v. Willis, 344 So. 2d 580,
591-92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); see also Hyde, supra note 21.
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"affected" person can request that the administrative agency hold an
information gathering hearing. An "affected" person may also partic-
ipate in such an information gathering hearing being held at the re-
quest of another "affected" person. The relative openness of the
administrative process in rulemaking is lost when an administrative
agency elects to develop its public policy positions through adjudica-
tion. 42 It is much more difficult to qualify as an intervenor in a for-
mal adjudicatory hearing and thereby gain the right to participate in
an adjudicatory proceeding where a nonrule policy may be estab-
lished. 43 It also unduly burdens the private party involved in the adju-
dicatory proceeding with the duty of calling into question the
legitimacy of administrative agency's policy choice found in a nonrule
order.
Requiring a single party to present evidence and argue against a
fundamental change in policy places that particular party at a severe
disadvantage .... Additionally, that party may not have the
financial resources necessary for gathering evidence and hiring legal
representation ... [to] argu[e] against the broader policy changes.
By limiting the quantity and quality of evidence presented, an
agency's decision to change its policy through adjudicating a single
case also has the effect of curtailing the effectiveness of judicial
review.'4"
Thus, the courts should act to prohibit the use of nonrule orders in
many cases, because nonrule orders are not consistent with the partici-
patory approach mandated by the APA when an administrative
agency exercises its discretion in establishing public policy.
Second, the letter and spirit of the APA is violated by nonrule or-
ders because administrative agencies have failed to make their orders
generally available through publication or subject matter indexing sys-
tem. 4 The APA requires that the rules and orders of administrative
agencies be made available for "inspection and copying" and that a
subject-matter index be maintained for each.'4 Generally, administra-
142. Florida Cities Water Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 384 So. 2d 1280, 1282 (Fla.
1980) (Boyd, J., dissenting).
143. Cf. Dore supra note 24; Florida Medical Ass'n v. Department of Professional Regula-
tion, 426 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Coalition of Mental Health Professionals v. Depart-
ment of Professional Regulation, 546 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (intervention in rule validity
challenge).
144. Florida Cities Water Co., 384 So. 2d at 1282 (Boyd, J., dissenting); see also Hyde,
supra note 21, at 2. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
145. Waas, supra note 49, at 194.
146. FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2) (1989).
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tive agencies have adequately implemented the legislative mandate in
this area for administrative rules. They are published with an ade-
quate subject-matter index in the Florida Administrative Code which
is readily available throughout the state and nation. This is not the
case with administrative agency orders. The vast majority of adminis-
trative agency orders remain unavailable and are not recorded in ade-
quate subject-matter indexes. Only selected administrative agency
orders are published in the Florida Administrative Law Reporter.147
Many administrative agency orders, if they are available at all, can
only be found at the Department of State or at the administrative
agency office in Tallahassee. Even if one resides in Tallahassee or is
willing to travel to Tallahassee to investigate these administrative
agency orders, access to them is effectively denied because there is
usually no subject-matter index available. Without the subject-matter
index it is virtually impossible to find the administrative orders rele-
vant to a particular problem. I4 Often a whole body of nonrule orders
exists which remain accessible only to administrative agency attorneys
or private attorneys located in Tallahassee who regularly practice be-
fore the particular administrative agency and can keep track of the
wide variety of nonrule orders. 49 It is virtually impossible for others
to have meaningful access. 50 Thus, one of the primary purposes of
the APA, of "broadening public access to the precedents" of admin-
istrative agencies is frustrated by administrative agencies using the ad-
judicatory policy making process."' The courts should act to enforce
the legislature's clear mandate in this area and prohibit the use of
147. See Senate Committee on Governmental Operations, A Review of Indexing of Agency
Orders Issued Pursuant to Chapter 120, F.S., the Administrative Procedure Act Report (1989 &
Supp. 1990).
148. Id.
149. See Hyde, supra note 21, at 2-3.
150. The fact [is] that an agency believes it is within its power to reveal, at an appropri-
ate time, its unpromulgated policy to a surprised and unsuspecting person or entity
subject to the policy .... Nonrule policy, by its nature, is invisible; it does not ap-
pear in an agency's index of rules or any other fixed location. A person impacted by
such policy has no knowledge of conduct required or proscribed by the agency.
Waas, supra note 49, at 194. A similar condition was noted prior to the adoption of the APA.
It was hoped that the APA "w[ould] cut down on the private knowledge of the policies which
shape agency decisions which is now possessed only by small groups of specialists and the agen-
cies' staffs." Reporter's Comments, supra note 8, at 6. Unfortunately, this aspect of administra-
tive law practice has changed little since 1975.
151. Reporter's Comments, supra note 8, at 3, 5-6. The use of the term precedents by the
Reporter clearly suggests that the public should have access not only to formally promulgated
administrative rules, but also to administrative orders. See FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)-(4) (1989);
Gar-Con Development v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 468 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla.
1st DCA 1985); Waas, supra note 49.
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nonrule orders until administrative agencies make such orders availa-
ble as mandated by the APA.
Third, the failure of administrative agencies to make their orders
readily available to the public undermines the ability of the courts to
assure that administrative agencies have acted rationally toward simi-
larly situated individuals.1 2 This argument rests on the assumption
that administrative agency orders, particularly nonrule orders, should
be subject to a limited rule of precedent. Generally, the value of ad-
ministrative agency orders as precedent is not coextensive with the
precedential value attached to judicial opinions.' Even treating ad-
ministrative agency orders as subject to a limited rule of binding prec-
edent is a somewhat controversial assumption in Florida, because
some courts have suggested that administrative agency orders should
have no precedential value similar to that associated with judicial opi-
nions. 54 From this point of view, administrative orders are merely the
resolution of a particular dispute involving only the parties to the or-
ders. Advocates of this point of view argue that if an administrative
agency wants to rely upon a nonrule policy in a subsequent adjudica-
tory proceeding, then it must establish in the subsequent order "the
accuracy of every factual premise and the rationality of every policy
choice which is identifiable and reasonably debatable must be ...
[supported] by some kind of evidence undergirding the order which
makes that policy choice on that factual premise."'5
Two reasons are offered for why administrative orders should not
be given precedential authority. First, administrative agencies need
flexibility to respond to changing conditions, and the application of
even a limited rule of precedent to administrative orders would effec-
tively prevent this from occurring. 56 Second, the application of a rule
of precedent could deprive a party in a subsequent adjudicatory pro-
ceeding of an opportunity to challenge the administrative agency's po-
152. See Hyde, supra note 21, at 3; FLA. STAT. § 120.68(12) (c) (1989).
153. "Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to decisions of administrative
bodies, consistency of administrative rulings is essential, for to adopt different standards for
similar situations is to act arbitrarily." R-C Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 350 F. Supp.
1169, 1172 (M.D. Fla. 1972); see Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Barr, 359 So.
2d 503, 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
154. "The doctrine of stare decisis is primarily applicable only to judicial decisions and is
not generally applicable to decisions of administrative bodies." Mercedes Lighting and Elec.
Supply v. Department of Gen. Servs., 560 So. 2d 272, 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
155. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 393 So. 2d 1177, 1182
(Fla. 1st DCA 1981); see also Public Serv. Comm'n v. Indiantown Tel. Sys., Inc., 435 So. 2d
892, 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
156. See Anheuser-Busch, 393 So. 2d at 1181. Cf. Maxwell Co. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 477,479
(6th Cir. 1969); Jets Serv., Inc. v. Hoffman, 420 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (federal
cases discussing this problem).
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sition as stated in the earlier order because it would functionally
foreclose the possibility of a successful argument for a change in the
administrative agency's earlier position. This is a very important right
guaranteed by the APA to parties appearing before administrative
agencies in adjudicatory proceedings. 17
These arguments fundamentally misconceive the impact a limited
rule of precedent would have in the context of administrative or-
ders."" It is an important and fundamentally sound policy that a lim-
ited rule of precedent apply to administrative orders for four reasons.
First, it would relieve administrative agencies of the burden of con-
stantly reestablishing the validity of their nonrule policy in every
case.159 Administrative agencies should be required to do this only
when the validity of an appropriately adopted nonrule policy estab-
157. Mercedes Lighting, 560 So. 2d at 278.
158. Of course even a rule of limited precedent for administrative nonrule orders has its
costs. The primary practical pressure, the requirement that the administrative agency will have to
repeatedly defend its adjudicatory policy making decision, has been undercut to the extent that
agencies have been encouraged by subsequent courts to rely upon their early orders as providing
a sufficient justification for nonrule policy. Anheuser-Busch, 393 So. 2d at 1182; Hill v. School
Bd. of Leon County, 351 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Albrecht v. Department of Envtl.
Regulation, 353 So. 2d 883, 886-87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1210 (Fla.
1978). But see Bowling v. Department of Ins., 394 So. 2d 165, 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (rejecting
the applicability of an adjudicatory policy established in a prior order to a subsequent case). As
was noted in McDonald, "[t]o the extent the agency may intend in its final order to rely on or
refer to emerging policy not recorded in rules or discoverable precedents .. . [which includes
prior agency orders] that policy must be established and may be challenged by proof" and coun-
tervailing policy and legal arguments. McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346
So. 2d 569, 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Thus, if a prior order established an agency nonrule policy
and it is discoverable, then the agency avoids the primary practical consideration which encour-
ages an agency to convert nonrule policies to rules through the rulemaking process, because it no
longer must repeatedly extensively justify its incipient policy in each case. In effect the prior
order can be treated as a rule. First, the court decisions indicate it might be sufficient for an
agency just to place the prior nonrule orders in the record, particularly if that order was found
sufficient in the judicial review process, and then prove by competent substantial evidence that
the circumstances of this case are sufficiently parallel to the prior order so that it should control.
Or, second, if an agency cannot rely upon the prior nonrule order by itself, then all it need do is
offer the same proof and legal arguments developed in the prior order and the nonrule policy is
established for purposes of the subsequent proceeding. Thus, the nonrule policy is proven by a
court process and the only new issues in these cases is whether substantial competent evidence
demonstrates that the current matter is sufficiently similar to that in the early agency order.
While the cost to the agency in the latter process is greater, it still has not been sufficient to
encourage agencies to move to the rulemaking process. In part, this consequence results because
under this scheme of things, there is no greater degree of certainty that the policy adopted will be
valid if it is created by using the rulemaking process as opposed to the adjudication process once
the policy has been held valid in one adjudicatory process.
159. To take this position is not to concede the larger point concerning when it is appropriate
for an administrative agency to have engaged in adjudicatory policy making. An administrative
nonrule policy has precedential value only if it arose in a context where it was appropriate for an
administrative agency to have engaged in this process.
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lished in the earlier administrative agency order is challenged by a
party in a subsequent proceeding,160 or if the earlier administrative or-
der is not available in advance to a party in the subsequent adminis-
trative agency hearing. 161 Second, by applying a limited rule of
precedent to administrative agency orders, the courts would not re-
quire administrative agencies to abandon their flexibility or foreclose
their ability to respond to changing circumstances. 62 Administrative
agencies would merely be put to the test of demonstrating what new
or other significant circumstance exists which was not noted or pres-
ent in the earlier nonrule order, or what facts concerning this case are
sufficiently distinct from those involved in its earlier nonrule order to
justify abandoning it.163 As the court noted in Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services v. Barr,164
Agency orders rendered in Section 120.57 proceedings may in the
same way indirectly determine controversies and affect persons yet
unborn. But the rule is stare decisis, not res judicata. If such a
person's substantial interests are to be determined in the light of a
160. HCA Gulf Coast Hosp. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 10 FLA.
ADMhN. L. REP. 2807, 2808-09 (1988).
161. [Wjhen an agency seeks to validate its action based upon a policy that is not re-
corded in rules or discoverable precedents, that policy must be established by expert
testimony, documentary opinions, or other evidence appropriate to the nature of the
issues involved and the agency must expose and elucidate its reasons for its discretion-
ary action.
Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Servs., 559 So. 2d 665, 667-68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (emphasis added) (quoting St. Francis Hosp.
v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 55 So. 2d 1351, 1354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989));
see also Amos v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 444 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1983). Of course, if the administrative agency has not established its public policy prefer-
ence in a prior order, then it must develop both the factual and legal basis for its public policy
position during the adjudicatory hearing. Ganson v. Department of Admin., 554 So. 2d 516,
520-21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
162. It is a myth that without broad discretion to use adjudicatory policy making powers
administrative agencies would be deprived of the flexibility needed to deal with changing circum-
stances. Administrative agencies retain a substantial amount of flexibility even when they have
used the rulemaking process to establish public policy. First, administrative agencies can inter-
pret the scope of the administrative rule in a reasonable fashion to deal with unforeseen circum-
stances. Second administrative agencies can also repeal or amend the administrative rule in
subsequent rulemaking activity as long as it is consistent with the statutory language and purpose
and is supported adequately in the rulemaking record. Nothing in the APA requires that admin-
istrative agencies view the administrative rules they adopt as forever binding. They remain free
to shift their policy at anytime. See Department of Admin., Div. of Retirement v. Albanese, 445
So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In case of an emergency, an administrative agency can
promulgate administrative rules very quickly using the emergency rulemaking provisions of the
APA. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(9)(a) (1989).
163. Amos, 444 So. 2d at 47.
164. 359 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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prior agency order or declaratory statement, Section 120.57
proceedings will afford him the opportunity to attack the agency's
position . . .and section 120.68 will provide judicial review in due
course. 6
A limited rule of binding precedent as suggested by the district court
in Barr does not prevent a party, including the administrative agency,
from arguing successfully that the nonrule policy established in the
prior administrative agency order should not apply to the current
case. 6 Third, an administrative agency should not be free to arbitrar-
ily choose whether it will or will not rely upon a preexisting nonrule
policy. If administrative agencies have this degree of freedom, then it
is an invitation to engage in arbitrary decision-making or favorit-
ism. 67 Treating policy established in a nonrule order as a binding
precedent helps guard against favoritism and arbitrary agency action
by offering a party the opportunity to require the administrative
agency to demonstrate it is acting in a rational fashion in light of its
past administrative orders.'6 A limited rule of precedent is also more
consistent with the letter and spirit of the APA which directs that re-
viewing courts remand a case to an administrative agency because the
agency's decision was "[i]nconsistent with an officially stated agency
policy or a prior agency practice, if deviation therefrom is not ex-
plained by the agency."' 69 Thus, courts should prohibit or restrict the
use of nonrule orders until administrative agencies make such orders
available to assure that administrative agencies are not acting arbitrar-
ily and infringing on the limited rule of precedent which should apply
to nonrule policy orders.
Fourth, the adjudicatory policy making process can result in a sub-
stantial waste of limited resources available to the courts. It has al-
ways been assumed that the threat of being required to reestablish the
validity of nonrule policy was a practical incentive for an administra-
tive agency to use the rulemaking process once it has clearly deter-
165. Id. at 505.
166. Department of Corrections v. Holland, 469 So. 2d 166, 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Of
course, parties may argue that an administrative agency must adhere to the policy it adopted in
its prior administrative orders. International Medical Centers, H.M.O. v. Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Servs., 417 So. 2d 734, 736-37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
167. See Hyde, supra note 21, at 3.
168. If administrative agency orders are not binding precedent, then they are of little value
except as a non-binding guide to future action by administrative agencies. Such a position would
trivialize the nature of the process through which administrative agencies develop nonrule policy.
169. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(12)(c) (1989); see International Medical Centers, 417 So. 2d at 736-
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mined what policy it wants to adopt. 7 ' If no limited rule of precedent
applies to administrative agency orders, then this process of reesta-
blishing the validity of a nonrule policy in every case would practically
dictate that the administrative agency adopt the nonrule order as a
rule. Regardless of a court's view on the issue of the precedential
value of an administrative agency's order, it is clear that the establish-
ment of the validity of a nonrule policy is a substantial burden on
both administrative agencies and courts if it must be constantly re-
peated. The courts have assumed that this process is a substantial bur-
den in terms of both expense and efficiency for administrative
agencies, but it is a burden the courts cannot require administrative
agencies to forego. 17 1
What this analysis has left perhaps unperceived and certainly un-
stated is the cost such a process ultimately imposes on the courts. Im-
posing this burden on the judicial resources of the state by
administrative agencies is intolerable. The courts should force admin-
istrative agencies to use the rulemaking process as a means of substan-
tially diminishing this constant drain on judicial resources.
VIII. WHY HAVE THE COURTS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY CONSTRAIN
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DISCRETION IN THE RULE/ORDER DICHOT-
OMY CONTEXT? I
In light of these problems, the question remains as to why the
courts have employed the McDonald limitations on adjudicatory pol-
icy making in an illusory fashion, rather than as a substantive check
on the scope of agency discretion. Perhaps an explanation for these
opinions is that the courts have not viewed the rule/order dichotomy
170. The incentive for agency rulemaking is to avoid the burden of having to "repeatedly
... defend its nonrule policy decisions in each case." Barker v. Board of Medical Examiners,
428 So. 2d 720, 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). As the court noted in the recent case of Ganson v.
Department of Admin., "[w]hen... an agency does not choose to document its policy by rule,
there must be adequate support for its decision in the record of the proceeding." 554 So. 2d 516,
520 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (emphasis added). The administrative agency in such a case must sup-
port in the record with competent substantial evidence every factual conclusion which is neces-
sary to justify the agency's policy choice as well as detailing the legal rationale for such policy
choices. Id. at 520-21 (citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 393
So. 2d 1177, 1182-83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)). This is a much greater burden than that imposed on
administrative agencies in a rulemaking context, where this justification process must be under-
taken only once. See Mitchell v. School Bd. of Leon County, 347 So. 2d 805, 807 (Fla. 1st DCA
1977).
171. This approach erroneously assumes that practical considerations will push agencies to-
ward the rulemaking process. See infra text accompanying notes 70-113.
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as a critical distinction in the judicial review process. 72 Several recent
opinions have indicated that the standard of judicial review remains
fundamentally the same whether an administrative agency used the ru-
lemaking process or the adjudicatory process in developing and justi-
fying its policy choices. 73 According to these opinions, the only
possible significant difference between these two methods for develop-
ing public policy is the type of record the court has to review. If the
rulemaking process involves a "draw out" hearing, this distinction
may not even be a significant distinction. As Judge Ervin, the primary
proponent of this point of view, has explained, a reviewing court
should not be concerned with classifying agency action as either a rule
or an order as it accomplishes nothing. 74 From this perspective the
important issues are "whether the agency.., adequately explained its
action [in the record], and, if it has, whether its action is within the
discretion delegated to it. '' 7 If an agency has satisfied the reviewing
court on these two points, "then the [reviewing] court should sustain
the action even though the agency's statement 'may have all the char-
acteristics of ... [a] rule."" '17 6 Under this approach courts cannot re-
ject an administrative agency policy merely because it was adopted
through the adjudicatory process rather than through the rulemaking
process. As the court noted in Public Service Commission v. Indian-
town Telephone Systems, Inc. ,'177 "there is no authority to compel the
agency to choose rulemaking over adjudication." 78
172. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Indiantown Tel. Sys., Inc., 435 So. 2d 892, 895-96 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1983). Not all court have even been disturbed by administrative agencies failing to follow
the procedural requirements for rulemaking. In some cases they enforced administrative policy
even though it was not properly adopted as a rule. See Enterprise Bldg. Corp. v. School Bd. of
Pinellas County, 445 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (per curiam); Hill v. School Bd. of
Leon County, 351 So. 2d 732, 733-34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (Mills, J., dissenting).
173. Pan Am. World Airways v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 427 So. 2d 716, 719 (Fla. 1983) (The
standard of judicial review is the same whether the Public Service Commission interpreted the
statutes it administers through rulemaking or adjudication.). Cf. Gulf Court Nursing Center v.
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 483 So. 2d 700, 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (The
court read the substantive statutes governing the awarding of certificates of need as functionally
applying the same standard of judicial review to both orders and rules.) The standard of judicial
review used in reviewing the validity of administrative rules "are in our judgment equally appli-
cable to review of orders" issued in a challenge to a proposed rule under section 120.54(4),
Florida Statutes. Florida Waterworks v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 473 So. 2d 237, 239 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1985) (per curiam).
174. Department of Revenue v. United States Sugar Corp., 388 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1980) (Ervin, J., concurring) (rejecting the policy position adopted by the Department of
Revenue because it had not adequately explained or factually justified its policy position).
175. Public Serv. Comm'n. v. Central Corp., 551 So. 2d 568, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (Er-
vin, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 573 (quoting United States Sugar Corp., 388 So. 2d at 598).
177. 435 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
178. Id. at 895-96.
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This point of view obviously trivializes the nature of what is at
stake in the argument over the rule/order dichotomy, particularly the
dangers of abuse and frustration of the APA participatory adminis-
trative process model. According to these opinions, such concerns
should not overshadow the substantive question of the validity of the
administrative agency's actions. Another important problem with this
approach is that it ignores the fact that the courts' approach to judi-
cial review of nonrule orders has removed many of the practical pres-
sures for agencies to move from the adjudicatory process to the
rulemaking process.
IX. A POssIBLE JUDICLAL SOLUTION TO THE RuLE/ORDER DICHOTOMY
PROBLEM
Any judicial solution to the rule/order dichotomy problem will in-
volve a major shift in the attitude of the members of the judicial
branch .179 First, the courts must recognize that it is their duty to en-
force the rule/order dichotomy. Second, the courts must realize that
the enforcement of the rule/order dichotomy involves more than
merely uttering stern warnings to administrative agencies that they
should consider using the rulemaking process in the future. When the
issue is raised, the courts must require administrative agencies to offer
evidence to support their claim that the subject matter of the nonrule
order is an area in which it is still inappropriate for them to have en-
gaged in rulemaking.' 80 Furthermore, the courts must, in appropriate
circumstances, invalidate administrative orders based upon nonrule
179. Other participants at the Seventh Administrative Law Conference have suggested legis-
lative solutions to the problem of nonrule orders. See Bonfield, The Quest for an Ideal State
Administrative Rulemaking Procedure, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. Rlv. text accompanying notes -
(1990). A suggestion made by Professor Dore which would in part cure the problem also could
be implemented by the judiciary. Impose a requirement that administrative agencies file and
index their orders before they will be considered rendered. This would at least make nonrule
orders more generally available. Further, its implementation need not necessarily await legisla-
tive action. The provisions of § 120.53(2)-(3) could be used by the judiciary to impose such a
requirement.
180. The courts may soon no longer be burdened with the task of identifying the relevant
criteria to be used in making these judgments. House Bill 1879 will be considered early in the
1991 legislative session. In addition to restating the legislative preference for rule making, as long
as it is feasible and practicable to adopt a rule concerning the subject matter, the bill provides
specific criteria for the Department of Administrative Hearings and courts to use in determining
whether an administrative agency has properly used the nonrule policy making process rather
than the rule making process in establishing public policy. If this bill becomes law, then the
courts no longer can choose to remain in the dark as to what standards they should apply in
judging whether rule making is required. H.B. 1879, § 1 (1991). Even if House Bill 1879 should
not become law the criteria listed in the bill is a good starting point for the courts in developing
their own meaningful criteria for enforcing the rule/order dichotomy. A process the courts
should have begun fifteen years ago, if not sooner.
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policy which should have been promulgated as a rule through the rule-
making process.18' This should be done even though the public interest
may suffer in the short run. Third, and the key to any judicial solu-
tion to this problem, the courts must use the judicial review process in
a manner that creates incentives for administrative agencies to self-
select the rulemaking process over adjudication to develop public pol-
icy. 8 2 This involves a return to a basic premise of the APA-a prefer-
ence for rulemaking. When an administrative agency has engaged in
"[riulemaking ... [it] is quasi-legislative action" and a reviewing
court must consider the validity of the administrative rule with the
appropriate degree of deference to an administrative agency's exercis-
ing that power."8 3 The judicial deference accorded an administrative
agency rule is of the same degree as that accorded a statute enacted by
the legislature.'" Applying this deferential approach to the judicial re-
view process, courts should invalidate an administrative rule only if it
is not 'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation,
and .. . [is] arbitrary or capricious."" ' 8 1 The arbitrary or capricious
standard of judicial review is one designed to maximize administrative
agency discretion in the rulemaking context. As the court noted in De-
partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Framat Realty,
Inc. : 186
When... an agency has responded to rulemaking incentives and has
allowed affected parties to help shape the rules they know will
regulate them in the future, the judiciary must not ... overly restrict
the range of an agency's interpretative powers. Permissible
interpretations of a statute must and will be sustained, though other
interpretations are possibleand may even seem preferable according
to some views. 87
181. When an administrative agency has failed to adopt a public policy position which
clearly should be a rule through the rulemaking process, then the classic remedy is to not apply
the policy to the party in this particular case and to direct the administrative agency to comply
with the requirements of the rulemaking process if it wants to enforce the policy in future cases.
Gulfstream Park Racing Assoc. v. Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering, 407 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla.
3d DCA 1981).
182. This suggestion encourages the courts to continue on the path of rewriting the APA
judicial review provisions. See infra text accompanying notes 114-139. If the courts are reluctant
to do so, the legislature should consider amending the APA to clearly establish a two-tiered
approach to judicial review.
183. Agrico Chem. Co. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 365 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1979) cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1979).
184. Id.
185. Id. (quoting Florida Beverage Corp. v. Wynne, 306 So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. 1st DCA
1975)); see also General Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (Fla.
1984).
186. 407 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
187. Id. at 242.
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This degree of judicial deference accorded to administrative agency
decision making in the rulemaking context is justified by the APA
preference for rulemaking.
[T]he APA plainly regards rules as the valuable endpoint in the
agency's development of policy. Rules represent an agency's
considered decision on issues left to the agency's decision by a
substantive act of the legislature. If we are to regard seriously the
incentives for rulemaking under the APA scheme, and if we are to
credit the deliberative process that the legislature has prescribed for
the development of agency policy, then surely an interpretative [or
substantive] rule emerging from this process should be accorded a
most weighty presumption of validity. Otherwise the elaborate
statutory scheme, pressing for rulemaking and prescribing how it
shall be accomplished with maximum public participation, has no
productive purpose, and it has become only a snare for agency
action, a device for evasion, avoidance, or postponement of effective
agency action in its authorized field of responsibility.s8
The courts must interpret the APA in such a manner that this degree
of judicial deference is sacrificed by administrative agencies when they
develop public policy in the context of adjudication. 1 9 In reviewing
the validity of administrative nonrule orders, the court must not grant
administrative agencies any deference in the judicial review process.19
Without the same degree of freedom to shape the factual record in
support of its policy choices during the adjudicatory policy making
process as compared with the rulemaking process, administrative
agencies will have a powerful incentive to limit the use of nonrule pol-
icy to appropriate circumstances. 191
If these three changes in the judiciary's approach to the rule/order
dichotomy problem occur, then the scope of the problem posed by
nonrule orders should be significantly diminished.
X. CONCLUSION
The conclusion, it seems, is obvious. Despite a legislative design
predicated in part on the judicial enforcement of the rule/order di-
188. Id. at 241-42.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 127-36.
190. See City of Tallahassee v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 441 So. 2d 620, 623 (Fla. 1983). In
adopting this approach the courts may find it necessary to overrule some decisions where they
indicated that legislative factual findings made by a hearing officer concerning legislative facts
can be rejected by the administrative agency even though they were supported by competent
substantial evidence.
191. General Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (Fla. 1984).
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chotomy, the courts have refused to effectively enforce this distinction
in the judicial review process. Or at the very least the courts have not
successfully used the judicial review process to set up effective incen-
tives for rulemaking and disincentives for adjudicatory policy making.
The result is the judicial sanctioning of agencies abandoning the rule-
making process as the preferred mode for developing policy. Absent
legislative action, the courts and the administrative agencies are the
only forums where a solution to this problem can be developed.192
There is no indication that administrative agencies plan to change or
are even considering changing their practice of relying on nonrule pol-
icy rendered in administrative orders. Thus, the burden is on the
courts to recapture the lost spirit of the McDonald decision and en-
force the legislative preference for rulemaking activity found in the
structure and purpose of the APA.
192. If a legislative remedy is going to be imposed, then in addition to establishing a two tier
standard of judicial review, I would favor a modification of section 120.54(5) to provide that if a
properly filed petition requests an administrative agency to adopt as a rule a nonrule policy
rendered in an administrative order, then the agency must initiate the rulemaking process or
refer the matter to the division director for a hearing to determine whether the denial of the
request for rulemaking was proper. At the hearing, the burden of proof shall be on the adminis-
trative agency to show that the denial of the rulemaking request was lawful. Such a scheme
should limit any adverse impact on administrative agencies by not striking at all nonrule policies.
It leaves the decision of what nonrule policies need to be promulgated as rules to those who are
regulated by the administrative agency or who have a substantial interest in the administrative
agency's regulations. Because the petition process is not cost free, only those nonrule policies
which truly need to be promulgated as rules probably would be subject to the petition process.
